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Throughout Roger Goodell's term as commissioner, the National Football League (NFL) had to 
address the long-term health issues caused by head injury, which damaged their organizational 
image and caused an ongoing crisis.  Using Coombs’ research on organizational crises (2015) 
and Benoit’s image repair theory (1995, 1997), I argue Goodell and the NFL used multiple 
strategies to attempt to repair the League’s image for their audiences.  Indeed, a closer look at 
texts used by Goodell and the NFL during his first decade as commissioner revealed three 
distinct stages of crisis repair between 2007 and 2016, all of which were unsuccessful because of 
a failure to address one primary audience—former NFL players.  Using rhetorical criticism of 
the NFL”s crisis discourse, I argue that Goodell’s repeated missteps led to an evolving 
organizational dilemma that can best be understood as a compounding crisis. 
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Chapter 1:  
The NFL’s Ongoing Concussion Crisis 
Introduction 
In recent years, the National Football League (NFL) has been accused of hiding or not 
distributing correct information regarding the long-term effects of brain injuries while 
encouraging players to continue to play a physical and violent game (Fainaru-Wada & Fainaru, 
2013; Raffel, 2013).  For years, the League denied the existence of any sort of connection 
between football and long-term brain trauma despite the evidence and research proving 
otherwise.  However, as former players found themselves with major brain damage, the NFL’s 
audiences began to demand answers from the League (Deford, 2012; Easterbrook, 2013; 
Edwards, 2013).  As the issue gained more attention and a new commissioner took over, the 
League had to address the issue and did so in a variety of strategic ways.  However, with each 
organizational response came criticism from both their internal and external audiences.  And 
with each criticism came another response from the organization, followed by more criticism, 
thus beginning a never-ending cycle between the NFL and its audiences.   
With a problem as critical as head trauma and the associated short- and long-term health 
concerns, how could a multi-billion dollar organization with this amount of attention make so 
many bad decisions while dealing with the problem?  Why did the NFL commissioner and 
spokesperson of one of the most popular organizations in the world continue to ignore the 
requests and questions of the former players who helped make the League what it is today?  With 
the sheer number of people watching the League and evaluating every single one of their moves, 
how did NFL commissioner, Roger Goodell, and the League handle this organizational crisis so 
poorly for so long?  I intend to answer these questions by reviewing Goodell and the NFL’s 
long-term handling of the concussion crisis.  I will do this by reviewing the rhetorical strategies 




they were incorrect in their choices and method, thus creating a poor reputation for their 
leadership and an evolving and never-ending crisis.    
To review these strategies, it is important to understand the organization’s leadership.  In 
2006, Roger Goodell was voted in as commissioner of the NFL (Maske, 2006).  Unfortunately 
for him, he began his new position the same time the concussion issues began to really gain 
national attention.  The previous commissioner, Paul Tagliabue, considered the problem to be a 
“pack-journalism issue” and chose to do little, making only minor corrective actions (Wolff & 
O’Brien, 1994; Fainaru-Wada, 2013).  Primarily, Tagliabue created the Mild Traumatic Brain 
Injury committee, made up of team doctors and researchers, to distribute information, but the 
name alone implies the little knowledge they had on the subject (Fainaru-Wada & Fainaru, 
2013).  Once Goodell became commissioner, former players, fans, and media expected the crisis 
to be handled more thoroughly (Fainaru-Wada & Fainaru, 2013).  This meant that every single 
choice Goodell made was being analyzed.  While many of these choices were shown to be in 
favor of the health and safety for the current players, these solutions were not the answers much 
of the NFL’s audience was expecting.  Indeed, this lack of attention to the former players would 
be the foundation of the immense criticism Goodell has faced the last ten years. 
Despite all of this, not everyone has criticized Goodell’s work as commissioner.  
Financially, the League’s profits have grown exponentially under his stewardship, almost 
doubling since 2006 when it was at just over $7 billion to over $13 billion in 2016 according to 
early projections (King, 2016a).  This financial gain has made him well respected by the NFL 
team owners and others who are reaping the benefits of these staggering profits.  Many of these 
same people have even spoken out in defense of him, calling him a “caring” and “great person” 




Although some believe he is quite likeable on a personal level, many others still believe 
he is responsible for seriously damaging the NFL’s reputation, and I argue nothing has been 
more damaging than how he has handled the concussion crisis.  Therefore, I believe it is 
important to analyze the actions of the NFL for this and several other reasons.  First, the NFL has 
a rather large amount of power, is recognized by millions of people, and functions as a 
multibillion dollar organization (King, 2016a).  Second, when an organization that has this much 
recognition across the country is dealing with a serious health issue that affects so many people 
within and outside of their organization, their rhetoric and actions need to be reviewed.  This is 
especially true in the case of the NFL, which long denied a connection between football and 
long-term brain health despite the scientific evidence proving the link (Fainaru-Wada & Fainaru, 
2013).  Third, their denial also needs to be reviewed because of the length of time they have been 
doing it - nearly thirty years.  The previous commissioner spent most of his term ignoring the 
evidence, with his final years largely criticized by the news media (Fairnaru-Wada, 2013).  
Within Goodell’s first few years as commissioner, the issue finally began to be more fully 
addressed and steps were taken to change the conversation – something that was expected 
(Vrentas, 2016).  However, almost every action he took was treated with criticism, causing a loss 
of confidence (Bedard, 2016).  Finally, it is important to understand how the distrust of someone 
in power can affect the organization he or she represents.   
It is my intention to argue that the NFL went into a state of organizational crisis after 
stories came out about former players having traumatic and fatal incidents as a result of head 
trauma from playing football.  This forced the League into a state of image repair to fix their 
organizational reputation for the players, media, and fans.  Spearheaded by Goodell after he was 




rebuild the perception of the NFL as an organization that understands health issues and cares 
about player safety.  I argue that Goodell attempted to rhetorically influence the message by 
using several strategies.  He did this, first, by having the NFL do their own research and 
presenting only their own information for an extended period of time and, second, by trying to 
appeal to the audiences’ emotions while attempting to prove they had made improvements in the 
game.  These strategies completely ignored the trauma the former players were facing, causing 
many of the main stakeholders, including the former players, media, and fans to criticize Goodell 
and the NFL for every reaction to the crisis (King, 2016b; 2016c).  This distrust has not only 
continued throughout the concussion crisis, but it has carried over to many other issues since.  It 
is the purpose of this research to show that these repeated mistakes caused the crisis only to 
evolve, thus never truly ending it.  This in turn has damaged the NFL’s image, Goodell’s 
reputation, and caused criticism of his judgment, decisions, and rulings in many other cases. 
In this thesis, I will first give a brief background of the NFL and their recent history 
regarding the issue of player safety, specifically dealing with concussions and head injuries.  It is 
then my intention to use Coombs’ research on organizational crises (2015) and Benoit’s image 
repair strategies (1995, 1997) as a foundation on which to review specific documents and 
strategies that Goodell, as a representative of the NFL, used throughout his first ten years as 
commissioner.  These documents will include internal literature, memos, press releases, and 
conferences that dealt with concussions.  As I will explain more thoroughly below, many of 
these documents follow issues that brought negative attention to the League and the overarching 
concussion crisis, and were thus used to bolster the NFL’s own image.  I will show that upon 
review of these documents, despite some improved knowledge and positive steps the League 




been ineffective in repairing their damaged image.  By reviewing multiple documents aimed at 
varied audiences, I believe a direct disconnect between the main spokesperson and audience will 
be revealed.  It is then my intent to show that because of this disconnect, their issues have 
amassed with time, causing their crisis communication to defy the basic findings of previous 
theoretical research.  With this, I intend to propose a new compounding crisis communication 
theory, one that can more fully describe and evaluate the development and evolutions of a crisis 
and help scholars better understand long and ongoing organizational crises in the future.  
Statement of Problem 
When reviewing the NFL, or any other major sports organization in the United States, it 
has to be analyzed differently than other organizations because of its unorthodox structure.  The 
National Football League is a professional sports organization comprised of thirty-two teams, 
with the NFL itself acting as a governing body that oversees every team, coach, and player 
(Constitution, 2006).  Each of these thirty-two teams are unique – all have their own history, 
traditions, rituals, heroes, rivals, and beliefs that organizations, cities, players, and fans support.  
Because of this, I believe the coaches and medical staff themselves are viewed as secondary 
offenders to the crisis – they allowed players to play injured, but it was because of the League’s 
overall lack of and distribution of knowledge that this happened.  The teams continue to have 
support from their fanbases, while the overarching governing organization that is the NFL is 
taking the blame. 
Overseeing the governing body and all thirty-two teams including every single person, 
action, and outcome is the principal executive officer, also known as the commissioner 
(Constitution, 2006).  This person, who is voted in by the ownership of the individual NFL 
teams, is expected to be “a person of unquestioned integrity to serve” the League and the 




individuals, hire employees, and negotiate contracts among many other duties and 
responsibilities (Constitution, 2006).  This power can be somewhat controversial but derives 
from the NFL’s constitution and by-laws and the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the 
League and the National Football League Player Association (Pacifici, 2014).  Through these 
powers, he is given the responsibility of interpreting and establishing policy (Constitution, 2006).  
Simply stated, the ability and freedom he is given to make decisions is quite expansive, as he 
alone reads the situation that is brought to him and he alone decides what next appropriate action 
should be taken.  This can prove to be a difficult task as many fans in the League are quite 
passionate about the game and know who the leader of the organization is, consequently giving 
many of them an opinion about the commissioner’s actions. 
Also, and quite importantly, this person is seen as the main spokesperson of the League.  
He has the ability to establish a public relations department which is “under his exclusive control 
and direction” (Constitution, 2006).  Therefore, we can assume that whether or not the 
commissioner is actually delivering the NFL’s message, any correspondence that comes from the 
League’s communication office is being delivered on behalf of the commissioner.  Indeed, Roger 
Goodell has been the face of the business-side of the League since the first day he stepped into 
office in 2006 (King, 2016b).  Much more visible than his predecessor, Paul Tagliabue, he has 
been a huge factor in what has made the NFL the defining sport of the country (Bery, 2013; 
Vrentas, 2016).   
As the face of one of the most popular organizations in the United States (and possibly 
even the world), Goodell is also a very polarizing figure.  As the commissioner of the NFL, he is 
seen as the image of the business, not the sport itself.  After ten years of being in this role, the 




given him strong support from the team owners (Bledsoe, 2015; Vrentas, 2016).  However, as he 
has been so public in and criticized by so many different audiences for his handling of multiple 
issues including player health and safety, rule changes, and on-field and off-field punishments, 
his personal reputation as the leader of the League has largely fractured (Babb, 2016; Bedard, 
2016, King, 2016a; Vrentas, 2016).  In reference to his reputation, one article simply stated, “the 
public hates this man” (King, 2016a).  In fact, an early 2016 public policy poll showed that only 
19% of fans surveyed believed Goodell was doing a good job (Public, 2016).  While many fans 
have varied opinions on why he may or may not be performing well as the commissioner, I 
believe a major part of this statistic, along with past complaints, is the result of Goodell’s 
ongoing lack of effective crisis communication when dealing with player health and safety and 
former player concussions.  
A Brief History of the NFL and Head Trauma 
Football, head trauma, and long-term brain health became a problem well before Goodell 
took over as commissioner (Fainaru-Wada & Fainaru, 2013).  Before I go any further into 
Goodell’s poor choices related to football and head trauma, I must first give a brief history of the 
subject that put the League into the crisis they were in when he became the leader of the NFL.  
The crisis started to take shape in the 1980’s when Pete Rozelle was commissioner.  Up until that 
point, head trauma in the academic and scientific fields was actually understudied.  In general, 
people widely knew nothing about the seriousness of head trauma or that concussions had long-
term effects (Fainaru-Wada & Fainaru, 2013).  However, in the early 80’s, researchers finally 
began to study head trauma in hospital patients, producing information that was so shocking that 
The Wall Street Journal ran an article calling concussions “a silent epidemic” in 1982 (Fainaru-
Wada & Fainaru, 2013).  As doctors began to study it in football, they quickly found that 




2013).  When players had head trauma during games and practices, there was no information or 
evidence readily available to stop the players from going back in to the game.  In fact, while at a 
cross-disciplinary conference designed to understand more about concussions in 1996, many 
former players explained that throughout their entire careers they had largely ignored head 
traumas, playing through any issues they may have had for fear of losing their jobs or 
disappointing their teammates (Bailes, Lovell, & Maroon, 1999).  From their perspective, 
football was a factory full of players who were considered interchangeable parts (Fainaru-Wada 
& Fainaru, 2013).  Each player has a back-up who can easily replace him if he was seen as weak 
or ineffective in his position.  This mindset was not only troubling but common throughout the 
entire League. 
These problems grew exponentially worse in the 1990’s when former players who were 
reaching their 50s and 60s began to report more neurological problems.  Hearing the stories, Paul 
Tagliabue, who was then the commissioner, was asked about concussions at a panel (Fainaru-
Wada & Fainaru, 2013).  He brushed off the seriousness of the problem by calling it a “pack 
journalism issue” and cited a low number of head injuries reported by the NFL team doctors 
since 1989 (Wolff & O’Brien, 1994).  The general lack of knowledge, along with the biased 
concussion “statistics” that were distributed, were not well-received by the reporters who were in 
attendance, prompting multiple articles criticizing the League including one by Sports Illustrated 
(Wolff & O’Brien, 1994; Fainaru-Wada, 2013).  Shortly thereafter, as a reaction to the growing 
criticism, Tagliabue finally acknowledged the potential danger of concussions and created the 
Mild Traumatic Brain Injury Committee (Coates, 2013).    
This was controversial for two reasons.  First, the person that was put in charge of the 




with bone and joint disorders (Fainaru-Wada & Fainaru, 2013).  Named the leader to what would 
be one of the biggest and most influential brain-study committees, Pellman had no background, 
education, experience, or scientific publications on the subject (Moskovitz, 2015).  Furthering 
this controversial choice was that he was practicing rheumatology, was the New York Jets team 
doctor, and was Tagliabue’s personal doctor (Fainaru-Wada, 2013; Petcheskey, 2013).  
However, Pellman’s lack of knowledge and views on the subject “were perfectly aligned with 
the NFL doctrine at the time, as articulated by Tagliabue and the NFL’s PR machine” (Fainaru-
Wada & Fainaru, 2013).  These views were what made Pellman’s leadership controversial for the 
second reason: he influenced the research and published articles that not only had faulty science 
but encouraged the NFL’s messaging around football and head trauma.   
Out of the League’s flawed research came 16 articles that, among other things, belittled 
concussions and their effects.  Beginning in 2003, the MTBI committee published multiple 
articles that, over a short amount of time, forced researchers to question the integrity of the 
committee (Fainaru-Wada & Fainaru, 2013).  The first couple articles cited statistics from their 
own team doctors while the third disputed another study that suggested repeated concussions can 
lead to longer recovery times.  The fifth article began to stir controversy as it claimed that 
professional football players are less susceptible to brain injury due to the fact they are 
physically more able to recover from them.  Less than two months after that, they published 
another article that claimed 
Players who are concussed and return to the same game have fewer initial signs and 
symptoms than those removed from play.  Return to play does not involve a significant 




It also went on to say that this theory could even be applied to younger athletes, including those 
playing in college and even high school (Ezell, 2013).  One of the most controversial articles, the 
idea that players who went back in showed fewer symptoms than those who sat out following a 
brain trauma was not well received (Moskovitz, 2015).  Unfortunately, the outlandish beliefs and 
publications started to give both the committee and the journal the articles were published in a 
poor reputation.  
Each of these articles were all published in the same journal—Neurosurgery.  This 
controversial research caused some to be rejected by peer reviewers and later disavowed by some 
of the authors (Fainaru-Wada & Fainaru, 2013).  As most articles have to be approved by peer 
reviewers to be published, Neurosurgery was different.  The editor-in-chief, Michael L.J. 
Apuzzo, who was appointed in 1992, made it possible for articles to still be published even if 
rejected.  Those who rejected it were given an opportunity to explain their opinions of the 
articles, but as some of those reviewers noted, few read the comments section, so what was 
published was considered “gospel.”  (Fainaru-Wada & Fainaru, 2013).  The collection of these 
articles were so controversial that some researchers referred to it as the Journal of No NFL 
Concussions (Fainaru-Wada & Fainaru, 2013).  All of this research, led by Dr. Elliot Pellman, 
made the Mild Traumatic Brain Injury Committee a “defender of the NFL” (Fainaru-Wada & 
Fainaru, 2013) while claiming to be an intelligent and scientific research group.  
 There were a few scientists who tried to challenge the League and their terrible research, 
and one who famously did this was Dr. Bennet Omalu.  The neuropathologist discovered chronic 
traumatic encephalopathy, or CTE, after testing former Pittsburgh Steelers Mike Webster’s brain 
in 2002.  Near the end of his life, the Hall of Fame linebacker began exhibiting strange and 




ended up at the morgue that Dr. Omalu worked at, giving Omalu the opportunity to study his 
brain.  What he found was a disease similar to that of punch-drunk syndrome, but different and 
undiagnosed (Fainaru-Wada & Fainaru, 2013).  Omalu discovered a tau protein buildup that was 
the result of repeated injuries to the brain in football players (Fainaru-Wada, 2013; What, 2016).  
A degenerative process, the brain tissue slowly dies away, leaving the buildup of the tau protein 
which essentially strangles different parts of the brain.  This can cause changes in personality 
such as depression, mood swings, confusion, impaired judgment, and many other brain issues, 
with those changes occurring at any point in the lifetime (Omalu, DeKosky, Minster, Kamboh, 
Hamilton, Wecht, 2005).  Compounding these issues, CTE can only be diagnosed after death 
(What, 2016).   
Dr. Omalu, along with a few other scientists, published their findings claiming there was 
a link between football, repeated mild traumatic brain injuries, and this brain disease as shown 
by Webster’s brain (Omalu et. al, 2005; Fainaru-Wada & Fainaru, 2013).  Unfortunately the 
beginning of a long disagreement, they were immediately discredited by Dr. Pellman and the 
MTBI committee, with Dr. Pellman saying Dr. Omalu was “completely wrong” with what he 
had discovered (Casson, 2006).  As this was completely against the League’s own messaging at 
the time, the MTBI committee instead continued to publish their own biased research while 
discrediting others that did not favor the League’s opinion (Fainaru-Wada & Fainaru, 2013).  As 
this battle continued on, more and more former players died in strange ways, but the League 
continued to deny any sort of connection between the two.  The media continued to report on the 
former players’ behaviors and deaths, especially as former players began to speak out with 
concerns for their own and others’ health.  This was evident in 2006 when former New York 




& Fainaru, 2013).  During his speech, which was unscripted, he called out the NFL for their lack 
of caring about the former players.  Carson said he was honored to be inducted into the Hall of 
Fame and honored to play in the NFL with the people he did (Carson, 2006).  However, he 
explained that he felt he and the others all played hard to make the League what it had become, 
yet they were all being ignored by the League as they faced their own problems.  Carson begged 
the League, 
I would hope that the leaders of the NFL, the future commissioner, and the players’ 
association do a much better job of looking out for those individuals.  You got to look out 
for ‘em.  If we made the League what it is, you have to take better care of your own 
(Carson, 2006). 
Feeling that the League no longer cared for them, this was a major call for action on a big stage 
that put the NFL in a negative spotlight.  Fortunately for Tagliabue, shortly after his speech, a 
new commissioner was named and he would no longer deal with this problem.   
The new commissioner, Roger Goodell, was voted in on the second day of what was 
supposed to be a three-day discussion (Maske, 2006).  Though he was one of five finalists, his 
accomplishments and length of time with the League made him the obvious choice for the 
position.  Indeed, immediately after graduating magna cum laude from William and Jefferson 
College with a degree in Economics, he wrote personal letters seeking employment to all thirty-
two teams and the commissioner’s office, which ultimately hired him as an intern in the public 
relations department under then-commissioner Rozelle.  Greatly influenced by his parents—his 
father, a D.C. lawyer and U.S. Congressman, and his mother, a womens’ rights activist—he 
aggressively climbed the occupational ladder over the course of twenty-five years with the NFL, 




able to use both his economics and public relations backgrounds to change the perception of the 
League.   And one of the first things he had to deal with was the challenge of fixing the League’s 
image as the growing PR crisis continued to mushroom (Fainaru-Wada & Fainaru, 2013). 
Unfortunately for Goodell, he struggled to do this. 
Many fans of the League love watching the sport due to the physical nature and violence 
associated with the sport (Deford, 2012).  Goodell, a huge lover of the game and incredibly 
knowledgeable of the League (Kaplan, 2016), has attempted to keep the players on the field safe, 
including making over forty rule changes since he has been in office, while not taking away from 
the characteristics that make the sport popular (King, 2016a; Vrentas, 2016).  But, as he took 
over the position, Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (CTE) and its direct and prevalent 
connection to former players was something he knew the League could no longer ignore 
(Fainaru-Wada & Fainaru, 2013).  He tried to ensure current players were getting better 
treatment, he created rule changes to make the game safer, and he had NFL funds donated to 
research and others organizations, including the United States Army and youth football Leagues, 
to increase knowledge about brain health and trauma.  However, with each step he took, he was 
criticized (Vrentas, 2016; King, 2016b).  While promoting health and safety now and into the 
future, Goodell chose to mostly ignore the former players and their families who were suffering.  
He did this by constantly saying there was a need for more information and knowledge while 
refusing to acknowledge an actual connection between the sport and brain trauma, which in turn 
angered many fans.  Instead, Goodell’s reputation repeatedly took hits for making what could be 
considered positive, corrective steps. 
I argue that all of this mishandling eventually led to the problems that he now suffers.  




a few other crises have occurred during his tenure that gained national attention.  Throughout 
these crises, he was given opportunities to react appropriately and set a precedent going forward.  
However, because his strategies in handling the concussion crisis were misdirected, it was 
expected that he would once again mishandle each new crisis.  Constantly criticized throughout 
each new crisis, the NFL was negatively put in the spotlight across national news.  Whether or 
not one was a fan of football, it was hard not to realize that Roger Goodell and the NFL were in 
trouble. 
Aim of the Study 
This ongoing situation and crisis is important to study because the NFL, football, and 
player health and safety are incredibly prevalent in our lives.  Football and Sunday have long had 
an interwoven relationship, but now, through Goodell’s leadership, football is also popular on 
Monday, Thursday, and even Saturday.  Goodell has also established new multi-million dollar 
contracts with ESPN, NBC, and CBS (Bery, 2013).  Fans can access football whenever they 
want through the NFL Network, websites, and social media accounts the NFL owns and operates 
(Vrentas, 2016).  Without one even wanting to be a fan, it is becoming increasingly hard not to 
be very aware of the NFL.   
Socially and economically, the League plays a major role in the American culture.  
Because of this, we need to study it to understand how the NFL’s actions are affecting our 
society.  Often, we use cultural pedagogies to shape what we should think and how we should 
behave (Silk, 2012).  In relation to sports, Michael Silk (2012) explained that the sporting culture 
“is involved in the production of assumptions about the world, influences our lives, and plays an 
important role in the production of our identities and experiences…and ultimately shapes 
behavior.”  Indeed, this role becomes even more important and persuasive during a time of crisis, 




argued, “It is socially important and scientifically interesting to ask why rhetors engage in 
deceptive or misleading rhetoric.”  Therefore, I am asking the following: how has Roger Goodell 
and the NFL rhetorically handled the ongoing concussion crisis that has aged and changed over 
time?  And, how might this ongoing concussion crisis be impacting perceptions of the NFL and 
their leadership?  In the case of Goodell’s handling of the concussion crisis, no matter how 
effective, helpful, or positive the response may be, the audience seems to react to the person, not 
the message. This, in turn, has affected his own reputation, causing a large amount of distrust 
between some of the main stakeholders and Goodell.  Following basic organizational crisis 
communication steps, the crisis, having been established as trauma related to former players’ 
head injuries due to playing football, has resulted in multiple organizational responses and lasted 
much longer than necessary.  Goodell, using image repair strategies, has shifted and redirected 
the conversation according to his own agenda, but he has not received a true resolution for the 
crisis.  I believe that this ongoing series of events and the discourse Goodell used in response to 
the concussion crisis made many stakeholders feel he could not be trusted in handling other 
serious issues reasonably.   
To analyze this discourse, terms and theories surrounding crisis communication, image 
repair, and reputation will be reviewed and used as a foundation for this research.  While this 
research is incredibly useful, I believe a more thorough analysis needs to be used to review what 
is happening with the NFL and Roger Goodell.  My intent, then, is to explain a new idea 
involving crisis communication which I refer to as a compounding crisis.  Simply explained, the 
initial crisis arises for the organization (concussions), the spokesperson/rhetor responds with the 
intent of ending the crisis (first by creating an internal memo for players), the audience reacts 




actually end.  Unfortunately for the spokesperson, the audience does not approve of the proactive 
step that was taken due to the misdirection of the spokesperson’s initial response.  This causes 
the spokesperson to take another step that the audience also disapproves.  This slight change in 
response causes the crisis to evolve and the repeated reactions by both the organization and 
audience creates the compounding issue.  It is necessary to understand that each step taken is in 
response to the initial crisis, though, as I will explain, there were related and unrelated issues that 
arose throughout that also affected his responses.  For Goodell, every step he took was related to 
the overarching concussion crisis.  The main problem was that he used too many of the 
ineffective image repair strategies while continuing to ignore the main audience that brought the 
crisis to light: the former players.  
Literature Review 
 To thoroughly analyze the NFL’s concussion issue, it is necessary to do a review of 
organizational crisis communication and many of the ideas that can play a role in that 
communication.  An organizational crisis is defined by Ulmer, Sellnow, and Seeger (2007) as “a 
specific, unexpected, and nonroutine event or series of events that create high levels of 
uncertainty and threaten or are perceived to threaten an organization’s high priority goals.”  For 
the purpose of this study, I will review the definition of an organizational crisis and explain how 
both the organization’s speaker and audience influence the messaging.  I will then offer 
strategies that the organizational rhetor can use throughout the crisis, including apologia (Hearit, 
2006) and Benoit’s image repair theory (1995, 1997), to rehabilitate the organization’s image.  
Throughout this, I will also discuss how issues management and legal litigation can both affect 
the organization’s response throughout the lifespan of a crisis. 
 Timothy Coombs (2015) further defines an organizational crisis as “the perception of an 




safety, environmental, and economic issues.”  He also notes a crisis “can seriously impact an 
organization’s performance and generate negative outcomes” (Coombs, 2015).  When 
organizations are facing a crisis, they must understand the crisis does not just begin and end, but 
that a crisis lifecycle exists.  Research has developed multiple “lifecycles” of crises, but they 
narrow down and naturally fall into the simple three-stage crisis: precrisis, crisis event/crisis 
response, and post crisis (Coombs, 2015; Hoffman & Ford, 2010).  The precrisis stage focuses 
on preventative measures.  The organization must consider crises that could arise and have 
responses prepared in case the crisis occurs.  The second stage is the actual act of, response to, 
and the containment of the crisis (Coombs, 2015; Hoffman & Ford, 2010).  Referred to as the 
crisis event or crisis response stage, this requires the organization to recognize it is happening 
and end it as quickly as possible (Coombs, 2015; Hoffman & Ford, 2010).  This also requires 
that the organization responds to the crisis while recognizing their audience.  The final stage, 
post crisis, is what happens after the organization and audience believe the crisis is over 
(Coombs, 2015).  This implies that all crises have an end whether or not they end well for their 
organization, which is judged by their stockholders and stakeholders.  For the purpose of this 
study, I will focus on the crisis event or crisis response stage and what that entails for the 
organization and their rhetoric.   
An organization is in a crisis when its stakeholders perceive the organization is in crisis 
due to an event or series of events (Coombs, 2015).  When working with organizational crises 
one must remember that audience perception is key (Benoit, 1995).  Courtwright believes that 
image is a combination of two components: a projection of corporate identity (what the 
organization wants the audience to think about them) and a reflection of public opinion (1995).  




is that which the audience holds.  This can be difficult for organizations because they typically 
need to consider multiple audiences when they are crafting their messages (Hoffman & Ford, 
2010).  Multiple audiences implies multiple opinions, desires, and expectations, so persuasion 
can be constrained.  Hoffman and Ford (2010) note that organizations “must figure out how to 
address the often-conflicting goals of the various audiences involved” if they want to create an 
effective crisis response.  As audiences are affected differently by the crisis, the organization 
must figure out which audience they must direct their messages towards.   
Coombs identifies this audience as the target audience with two audiences in a crisis: 
victims and nonvictims (2015).  Victims are the people who were somehow hurt by the event 
that has brought about the crisis.  For the NFL, these are the former players and their families 
who have suffered from CTE or other degenerative brain diseases as a result of playing football.  
The nonvictims can be “divided into potential victims and voyeurs” (Coombs, 2015).  Potential 
victims are people that were not hurt by the actual crisis but could have been.  In the case of the 
NFL, these are the current players or recently retired ones who have not seen the effects of 
football and brain trauma but still could.  The third audience is the voyeur audiences who are 
“watching the crisis to see how the organization responds but are not at risk of being harmed” 
(Coombs, 2015).  These audiences use different ways to evaluate crises, whether that be through 
traditional or social media.  Voyeur audiences for the NFL have been the media and the fans.  All 
of these audiences have been important for the NFL, but as I will show later, they have failed to 
address their messaging appropriately. 
Organizations must take these audiences and their opinions into account as they craft 
their messages.  “If these audiences dislike the crisis response, it will damage their relationships 




perceptual” and  “stakeholders…help to define an event as a crisis” (Coombs, 2015), audiences 
naturally want to know how and why the crisis occurred.  Attribution theory is the idea that 
people assign responsibility for negative and unexpected events (Coombs, 2015).  When a crisis 
arises, this attribution occurs because the audience has found the act undesirable and they believe 
the organization is responsible (Benoit, 1995).  According to Coombs (2015), "attributions shape 
how a stakeholder feels and behaves toward the organization.”  When an organization or a 
representative of the organization repeatedly makes claims that the audience is not looking for or 
does not want to hear, it can worsen the situation for the organization.  This idea also implies that 
different members of the organization take more or less blame throughout the process (Benoit, 
1995) and the person who is delivering the message can hurt its effectiveness.    
Leadership is important when handling an organizational crisis.  The person who is 
actively responding will be associated with both the organization and the crisis directly.  How 
they handle it is also important because “leadership can have a major impact on the effectiveness 
of the crisis management effort” (Coombs, 2015).  Good leaders should be able to detect when 
there could be or is about to be a crisis and have a plan prepared to fix it.  However, crises 
happen whether or not organizations are prepared for them, thus the leader of the organization 
must be able to direct where the organization goes from that point.  Not only do they set the 
direction for the organization, but they must regain the confidence of their main stakeholders 
(Lucero, Kwang, & Pang, 2009).  Ware and Linkugel (1973), who studied individual responses 
in crises, stated “in a rhetorical situation as complex as that of accusation and response, a speaker 
would be expected to attempt to change the meaning of some, but not all, cognitive elements in 




case of the NFL, should respond to the problem as quickly as possible to repair their credibility 
with the audience.  This is especially true when the organization’s integrity is being questioned.   
The regaining of credibility does not always happen though, and this can have negative 
impacts on the reputation of the speaker and organization.  A reputation is an evaluation 
stakeholders have placed on the organization and its leaders.  They are “built through direct and 
indirect experiences with organizations” (Coombs, 2015), which create the perceived image the 
stakeholders have of the organization.  To handle their reputations, organizations want to ensure 
their image is favorable.  Indeed, “how publics view the reputation of a company prior to, during, 
and after a crisis often plays a pivotal role in how effectively a company responds to and 
recovers from a crisis” (Turk, Jin, Stewart, Kim, & Hipple, 2012).  Audiences make attributions 
for crisis responsibility, thus forcing a more positive or negative reputation for the organization 
and its leader.   Stakeholders typically base their personal views of the leadership on indirect 
experiences of situations they believe leaders mishandled (Coombs, 2015).  Coombs (2015) 
further states, “crisis responsibility can be a threat to an organization’s reputation because 
stronger attributions of crisis responsibility produce greater reputational damage.”  Unfortunately 
for CEOs, their personal reputation is often associated with the organization’s reputation.  When 
a crisis happens to an organization, not only does the leader have to actively handle the crisis, but 
they have to or at least should consider their own alongside the organization’s image.  These 
constraints, along with audience perception, affects their organizational response. 
Audience perception is important for the organization’s crisis response strategies. 
Organizations must react to a crisis by engaging with their audiences.  Not only must the 
organization and leader figure out what arguments to make, but they must also know how to 




they explain, “Crisis communication concerns the processes whereby organizations create and 
exchange meanings among stakeholders regarding the risk of crisis, cause, blame, responsibility, 
precautionary norms, and crisis-induced changes in the organization and its relationship to 
stakeholders.”  To be effective, the organization has to understand what the expectations are of 
the audience and “use their communication strategically…to purify their damaged images” 
(Hearit, 2006).  The organizations can then use these expectations to understand how to 
appropriately create the immediate messaging the audience is looking for.    
There are many responses to organizational crises, but the first that needs to be reviewed 
is apologia.  Organizational apologia is a “broad term that means to respond to organizational 
criticism by offering a vigorous and compelling defense” (Hearit, 2006).  Apologia may seem to 
infer an apology, but that is not always the case.  Hearit (2006) defines the difference: “apologia 
refers to the act of giving a defense, whereas apology typically means the offering of a mea 
culpa.”  Apologia is in fact a broad term, as an organization can attempt to offer a compelling 
defense in a number of ways (Hearit, 2006).  This type of rhetoric “may or may not include 
admitting responsibility for a negative event” (Hoffman & Ford, 2010).  Many times, this 
depends on whether or not they can be legally liable for the event that brought on the crisis. 
Unfortunately legal liability can limit the organizational response, as it is believed that 
organizational apologies are highly discouraged by their corporate attorneys (Patel & Reinsch, 
2003).  Hearit (2006) states, “to apologize and admit guilt is to assume responsibility and 
culpability.”  If the apology is directed towards the victims of the crisis, then it can be seen as an 
admission of guilt, thus potentially creating a legal situation for the speaker and the organization 
(Hearit, 2006).  These legal constraints thus cause an ethical and rhetorical problem for the 




also be careful in how his or her organization is perceived by audiences (Tyler, 1997).  Patel and 
Reinsch (2003) argue, “A corporate apology can be an important element in perceived goodness 
because issuing an apology can affect the opinions of citizens.”  In fact, they continue to argue 
that this can affect future litigation brought against them as judges and juries could use the 
organization’s image as a foundation for their judgment (Patel & Reinsch, 2003).  However, as 
legal liability is still a very real concern for an organization and its leadership, organizations have 
started to “apologize” by offering compensation rather than actually admitting to wrongdoing 
(Hearit, 2006).  Paying the victims shows that the organization acknowledges there is indeed a 
problem, but offers no legal admittance.  Whether or not the compensation is accepted, and 
despite the legality, organizations and their leaders must still find ways to again be in favor with 
their audiences.    
Regardless of the reason for the messages or the manner in which they are distributing 
the messages, all organizations act with the intention of restoring their damaged images (Hearit, 
2006).  To do this, their messages are strategically performed in a way that refutes the accusation 
brought against the organization to repair their damaged image (Hearit, 2006).   Multiple 
scholars have come up with different types of explanations or guidelines in which to analyze an 
organization’s rhetoric, but for the purpose of this thesis, I review Benoit’s five strategies within 
Image Repair Theory.  
This theory was developed and published by William Benoit in 1995 and expanded in 
1997 and 2015.  Building upon Ware and Linkugel's original individual apologia strategies, 
Benoit created five broad strategies for organizations to use which include denial, evading 
responsibility, reducing the offensiveness of the act, corrective action, and mortification (Benoit, 




committed the act they are accused of, denies it ever having occurred, or denies that the act that 
occurred was harmful (Benoit, 1997; Brinson & Benoit, 1999; Hoffman & Ford, 2010; Lucero et. 
al., 2009).  The second strategy is evading responsibility, which has four subcategories, 
provocation, defeasibility, accident, and good intention (Benoit, 1997).  For the purpose of this 
paper, I will define defeasibility and use that strategy for my analysis.  As described by Benoit, 
speakers use defeasibility to claim that there was a lack of information or control to prevent the 
events that caused the crisis (1997).  The third strategy is reducing the offensiveness of the act, 
and this strategy has six subcategories: bolstering, minimization, differentiation, transcendence, 
attack the accuser, and compensation (Benoit, 1997).  Again, for the purpose of this study, 
bolstering will be the strategy that is focused upon.  Bolstering is an act that is used to try to 
restore positive feelings towards the organization by which the rhetor attempts to remind the 
audience of their positive attributes while offsetting any negative feelings the audience may have 
(Benoit, 1997; Brinson & Benoit, 1999).  In doing this, the speaker tries to personally “identify 
himself with something viewed favorably by the audience (Ware & Linkugel, 1973).  The fourth 
strategy is corrective action which is a promise by the organization to correct the situation by 
either repairing the problem or trying to prevent it from happening in the future (Benoit, 1997).  
The final strategy is mortification, which is the act of actually accepting responsibility for the 
event that caused the crisis.  This is typically followed by an apology (Benoit, 1997). 
Many of these responses and others that were not mentioned do take into account the idea 
of values advocacy and what the organization’s audiences believe to be important in relation to 
the crisis.  Bostdorff and Vibbert (1994) have studied and offered three ways organizational 
rhetors use values advocacy in crisis communication.  First, they argue that it can enhance the 




expressing societal values, they associate themselves with those same values (Bostdorff & 
Vibbert, 1994).  As image is how others interpret the subject based on their own beliefs, values 
and attitudes, image also reflects on to others how they should act.  This works well for 
organizations as they can not only reflect the public’s opinions but also actually influence the 
audience’s opinion to be that of their own (Bostdorff & Vibbert, 1994).  Second, values 
advocacy techniques allow organizations to deflect criticism throughout the crisis.  They can 
attempt to distract and pull attention to what they want their audiences to believe in or believe 
the organization is capable of doing (Bostdorff & Vibbert, 1994; Hoffman & Ford, 2010).  Third, 
organizations establish values they can draw from in the future, whether or not they are in a 
crisis.  This can give the organization credibility in the future by already having an understanding 
of what the organization believes in (Bostdorff & Vibbert, 1994).   
Bostdorff and Vibbert (1994) also argued that these benefits can be achieved in four 
ways: by making explicit appeals to audience’s values, showing how the organization and their 
products uphold similar values, discussing past philanthropic work or partnerships, and praising 
individuals who uphold and enact those same values.  Unfortunately, the use of values advocacy 
can often be criticized as nothing more than image rebuilding for the organization (Bostdorff & 
Vibbert, 1994).  Organizations have to be careful and attentive when interpreting their audiences 
beliefs and values.  This can cause more issues and problems, something that can hurt the 
organization and their crisis repair strategy. 
Values advocacy also plays an important role in issues management within organizations.  
Hoffman and Ford (2010) explain that “an issue arises when there is a level of agreement that 
some problem exists, but there is not agreement on whether or not it is serious enough to merit 




demand a response, audiences perceptions of the issue is much more important to organizations 
in making their next move.  The response, which can be delivered in any number of ways, often 
elicits an engagement between the organization and their audiences rather than the organization 
having to directly answer the crisis (Hoffman & Ford, 2010).  These issues can be a part of the 
overarching crisis, or they can be separate, but either way the organizational response is done in 
a way to improve the organization’s image.  Again, organizations are attempting to prioritize 
values for their audiences.   
Used effectively, Benoit argues that these strategies should work in repairing an 
organization’s image (1995).  Currently, theory holds that when the audience response occurs, 
the crisis ends; however, I believe it actually evolves based on the audience.  Hoffman and Ford 
do say an organizational crisis response can be a long-term process which forces an organization 
to adapt to events and the audience (2010).  But, as previously mentioned, organizational crisis 
theory is a three-step process, essentially a beginning, middle, and end.  I argue that in some 
cases there is not necessarily an ending, but rather an evolution of the crisis.  The crisis occurs 
and the organization formulates their response based on what they believe the audience will want 
to hear or what they want the audience to believe.  If the response is received poorly, the crisis 
does not end but rather compounds.  This happens because the organization has to take into 
account the original, foundational crisis as well as the new factors or issues of which the 
audience disapproves.  The memories of the original crisis still linger with the audience, but now 
new opinions have surfaced revolving around the most recent organizational response related to 
the same issue.  Thus, the crisis evolves and forces the organization to create yet another new 
response.  If the audience response continues to hold negative perceptions of the organization 




Goodell and his responses regarding the NFL concussion crisis.  I now intend to show that 
Goodell ignored what the audience wanted to hear and instead did multiple other acts to try to 
change rather than solve the problem.  His strategies in responding to the crisis and its related 
issues change and do so specifically, breaking down into what I identify as three different time 
periods.  After years of watching Goodell constantly ignore his audience, his reputation suffered 
and when other issues came up, there was a complete lack of trust in his judgment.  All of these 





Chapter 2:  
2007-2011: Making the Game Safer for Our Guys on the Field Today 
 
 After Goodell became the commissioner in 2006, he understood that the League was in a 
crisis regarding concussions (Fainaru-Wada & Fainaru-Wada & Fainaru, 2013).  As many 
former players aged, more were dying in strange ways, each story adding to the overarching dark 
cloud that surrounded the NFL and their image.  Knowing they were going to have to address 
this before it damaged the League’s future, Goodell quickly took steps to rectify the crisis.  As 
the leader and main spokesperson of the League, Goodell took charge of the situation, trying to 
find ways to repair the League’s image.  However, Goodell’s attempts failed, eventually hurting 
the League’s image and his own personal reputation as well. 
Upon review of multiple documents that were distributed during Goodell’s time as 
commissioner, I argue that during the first four years of his term he used Benoit’s denial strategy, 
reducing the offensiveness of the act, and corrective action strategies to attempt to repair the 
NFL’s image.  Unfortunately for the League, these did not work in repairing the organization’s 
image because the actual crisis at hand was blatantly ignored as Goodell’s actions were done to 
benefit the future of the League rather than the former players.  Simply put, almost every single 
action was directed towards the wrong audience.  The few moments where the League did reach 
out to the former players were severely weakened due to the refusal to admit the link between 
football and long-term brain health.     
 Benoit’s strategies have a tendency to overlap, causing the crisis response to contain 
several strategies to repair the organization’s image.  However, there are multiple elements to 
these strategies, so for the purpose of this study, I will explain the definitions and scope I have 
used to evaluate this time period.  The first strategy is something that is both explicit and implicit 




the organization and the crisis (Benoit, 1995), was used to reject any possibility of a relationship 
between football, head trauma, and long-term brain health.  Closely tied to this is reducing the 
offensiveness of the act, which can be done in a number of ways.  I argue that Goodell does this 
through three specific strategies.  First, he does this through minimization, a technique that is 
similar to denial except that he downplays any and all possibilities of anyone believing there is a 
connection without actually saying there is not one (Benoit, 1995).  Second, he offers 
compensation to former players (the only real attempt at acknowledging their health issue) in the 
form of The 88 Plan (The 88, 2007).  As I will explain later, they make this offer, but it is so 
limited in its scope it is almost shameful to offer to the former players.  Finally, bolstering is 
used as part of reducing the offensiveness and is a technique they constantly use.  During this 
first time period, Goodell and the League point out the things they have already done for the 
current players but do not set goals for the future (which is somewhat done in the second time 
period as well).   
The third image repair strategy that is used is corrective action, which Benoit (1995) 
defines as the pledge to rectify the situation that brought them into the crisis.  This fails 
massively for them for two reasons.  First, the overall crisis is about the former players and their 
health.  The only attempt at making amends with them is through The 88 Plan, which when 
announced was limited to coverage of only one major head-health issue (The 88, 2007).  By 
doing this, they essentially told the players that anything outside of the specific disease was not 
acknowledged by the NFL.  Second, many of the “corrective actions” that were taken were 
directed towards the current players, primarily through dissemination of information.  While the 
information was helpful and more than they had done in the past, the NFL put all of the pressure 




2007; Poster, 2010).  Whether or not the players read it, the League seemed to think the players 
no longer could say they were unaware of the repercussions of playing football.  Goodell and the 
League could say the information was available and they had distributed it for the players’ 
consumption, essentially wiping their hands clean of any future problems the players may face.   
These strategies are often woven together intricately and firmly, as many of Goodell’s 
steps started with an attempt at a corrective action, but underlying it all was his and the League’s 
refusal to admit any sort of connection between the sport and head trauma.  This constant tie-in 
between these strategies is ultimately their downfall as much of the League’s image repair 
discourse was completely contradictory.  Yes, they were getting information to their players, but 
along with it was their refusal to admit there was a possibility that the former players were 
suffering from this brutal sport.  Moreover, in an attempt to protect their brand, they used their 
own faulty science to deny the link and ultimately create the information the players received.  
Goodell’s First Strategies    
To get caught up on the situation, to understand exactly how severe it was, and to learn 
about the research that was going on in the field, Goodell called for a Concussion Summit early 
in his tenure as commissioner (Fainaru-Wada & Fainaru, 2013).  Indeed, this summit was the 
first official step Goodell made in fixing the crisis, and, by making a corrective action, the first 
step in repairing the image of the League.  In June 2007, medical personnel including doctors, 
trainers, consultants, and others were gathered together to present their findings and “debate the 
science of concussions” (Fainaru-Wada & Fainaru, 2013).  Each attendee received a packet full 
of information including the Mild Traumatic Brain Committee’s Neurosurgery papers and a 
laminated sheet titled, “Concussion Information for NFL Players and Family” (Fainaru-Wada & 




The act alone of hosting the summit immediately after Goodell’s start as commissioner showed 
the effort and change the League tried to make. 
However, the summit was met with widespread criticism and considered a disaster by 
many (Fainaru-Wada & Fainaru, 2013).  One of the reasons for this negative reaction was that 
the League invited many of their own doctors and researchers who had already been criticized 
for publishing research that favored the NFL’s position, and then they distributed their 
information to everyone who attended.  They also invited some doctors who had published 
documents contradicting the NFL’s research or had at least spoken out against the League, but 
the NFL failed to invite some of the biggest names in CTE research at the time including Dr. 
Bennett Omalu (Mihoces, 2007).  Although the summit was intended as a way for the NFL to 
regain credibility by showing they were taking concussions seriously, the blatant refusal to invite 
some doctors who were leading the way in CTE research was viewed as a way to ensure the 
summit would offer the NFL the possibility to refuse to admit an actual connection between the 
sport and CTE.  With all of the controversy the summit caused, Goodell needed to take more 
actions (Mihoces, 2007).   
With information compiled from the summit, the League issued an internal memo that 
was distributed to all players and team personnel in August 2007.  The memo was an outline for 
everyone within each organization about “the recent steps…taken to address the management of 
concussions in the NFL” (NFL, 2007).  Grasping for credibility, the League referred to the 
summit that was hosted in June, offered a pamphlet on concussions, and announced the 
establishment of a confidential hotline for players to use if they or a teammate were being forced 




Using the information from the summit and the previous research from the MTBI, the 
pamphlet was created to give players what Goodell considered to be a convenient way to identify 
symptoms of a concussion if they took a hit to the head.  It also explained, in a somewhat 
demeaning way, that a concussion is more than a “ding” to the head, and then listed symptoms 
and information about the steps that should be taken if the player believes he may have a serious 
head injury (NFL, 2007).  Though useful information for the players to have, the pamphlet had 
two negative outcomes.  First, it placed the liability on the players if they did get a concussion.  
Before, former players had said they were unaware that the sport they were playing was doing 
somewhat terrible things to their long-term health because of the League’s lack of sharing 
information and the “be-tough” mentality that was encouraged (Fainaru-Wada & Fainaru, 2013).  
On the surface, the effort seemed credible for the League, but instead this naturally put all of the 
responsibility of playing safe and identifying the symptoms if they had any directly on the 
player.  The NFL could claim that with the information given it was now up to the injured player 
to tell the medical staff when they were having a problem.  They would have to make the 
decision to receive treatment and come out of the game - something that most competitors do not 
want to do.   
Second, the evidence the League used to create this pamphlet was research from their 
own medical staff, a point emphasized to ensure others realized they were all collectively taking 
appropriate steps to address the issue (NFL, 2007).  Unfortunately for the League, this was not a 
good choice because they had already been criticized by the media for using their own doctors 
(Fainaru-Wada & Fainaru, 2013).  Despite inviting some outside doctors to the Concussion 
Summit, they continued to only acknowledge and distribute research that was created by their 




This was furthered by a statement in the concussion pamphlet that was found to be quite 
controversial:  
Current research with professional athletes has not shown that having more than one or 
two concussions leads to permanent problems if each injury is managed properly.  It is 
important to understand that there is no magic number for how many concussions is too 
many (NFL, 2007).   
It was this deliberate minimization that allowed the League to be able to avoid the discussion on 
their own terms.  Denying the existence of an issue in relation to their organization gave them a 
way to dispute the common idea that they were responsible for the issues, consistent with 
Benoit’s form of denial (Hearit, 2006).  To the NFL, it allowed them to negate a connection 
between football, concussions, and long-term health care, further reducing the offensiveness of 
whatever previous actions they had been accused of.   
 Despite the facts that were medically inaccurate and potentially damaging, the memo 
served two purposes for the NFL.  First, it attempted to show the internal audiences that the 
League was actually taking the issue seriously and was ready to move forward.  Understanding 
that some players either do not know the symptoms or do not want to admit them due to potential 
loss in playing time was important for the League to figure out how to help them going forward.  
Second, the pamphlet and memo addressed one of the major complaints of the former players – 
that they were never given the proper information to help themselves (Fainaru-Wada & Fainaru; 
2013).  The current players now had at least some more “facts” and guidelines at their fingertips, 
though this would not help the former players who were already suffering from this lack of 




 Also in September of that year, in conjunction with the NFL Players’ Association, 
Goodell and the NFL announced the “88 Plan” designed to help former players who were 
suffering from “dementia” (The 88, 2007).  Under the plan, former players would receive up to 
$88,000 per year to pay for their medical bills if they fit the plan’s criteria.  This compensation 
was an attempt to reduce the offensiveness of the act and was one of the few times the NFL 
actually proactively addressed the former players.  However, the guidelines to receive the yearly 
money were strict and rigid, requiring a match to what was “defined by the 88 Plan,” and was 
based on the NFL’s own doctors and research (The 88, 2007).  So again, the NFL was using their 
own science to distribute information that they considered to be helpful, which was considered a 
slap in the face by many of the former players for multiple reasons.  Most importantly, head 
trauma from playing football was causing diseases other than dementia (Fainaru-Wada & 
Fainaru, 2013), but the NFL was refusing to acknowledge it.  This left many former players 
unable to receive any benefit from the plan; therefore, they continued to suffer mentally and 
physically, while racking up bills from medical treatments.   
The information and plan were the only major actions taken regarding concussions for 
the next two years.  While both corrective in their own rights, the external audiences were still 
not satisfied with the actions that were taken (Easterbrook, 2010).  As more outside research was 
published showing direct connections between the sport and serious head trauma and health, the 
NFL still refused to acknowledge the link and, instead, continued to publish and base their 
statements on their own research (Fainaru-Wada & Fainaru, 2013).  Much of this biased research 
concluded “no NFL player had experienced chronic brain damage from repeat concussions, and 
that professional football players do not sustain repetitive blows to the brain on a regular basis” 




in October 2009 (Legal, 2009).  An opportunity to have an honest discussion about the issues the 
League and the former players were facing, Goodell instead saw it as a chance to bolster their 
image by discussing all of the “wonderful” things the League has done to correct the concussion 
crisis through medical enhancements and player protection, all while still denying the 
connection. 
In Goodell’s opening statement, he recognized that the hearing was called to discuss 
concussions, but he also stated “it is important to discuss our overall commitment to the safety 
and welfare of the football’s most valuable assets – those individuals who play our sport” 
(Testimony, 2009).  He emphasized this by showing all of the steps the League had taken to keep 
the players safe not only in regard to their brain health but also many other ways by saying “the 
millions of dollars we spend on prevention, treatment, and research of injuries will pay off for 
our current and future generations of players both in football and other sports” (Legal, 2009).  
Following this, he listed pension, disability, and medical benefits as initiatives the League had 
taken to improve or assist with the health of the players (Legal, 2009).  Again, while all positive 
actions, it is easy to see how Goodell’s comments were an attempted distraction for the hearing 
committee to bolster the NFL’s image in overall health and safety of players.   
 Goodell’s public relations background shone through when he finally reached the topic of 
concussions and explained what he considered to be proactive steps the League had taken.  First, 
he admitted that the League understood “that concussions occur in football and other sports and 
that they can have serious effects if not properly treated” (Legal, 2009).  This was known 
because of all the research the NFL had a hand in producing over the previous 15 years and, 
through their own graciousness and for the benefit of others, had made public.  Listing examples 




concussion issue in football has been simple and direct – medical considerations must always 
take priority over competitive considerations” (Legal, 2009).  As evidence for this, he listed four 
major steps he and the League had taken.  First, they were committed to research to address the 
needs of the retired players.  He stated they had given more than $5 million to research over the 
past fifteen years (this would dramatically change in the future) to understand the science around 
concussions.  Through this he admitted there have been disagreements, but that the science will 
help the League improve the sport.  Second, he and the League had created and modified playing 
rules to reduce head and neck contact, thus creating a safer environment for the players on the 
field.  Third, their policies on treatment of concussions had improved as the new policies were 
created by the League without the influence of individual organizations.  Moreover, these 
policies were now executed by the team doctors and medical staff, not by the coaches or players, 
and these team doctors and staff had also “pioneered the use of neuropsychological testing for 
players" who experience concussions (Legal, 2009).  Finally, he stated that research was one of 
the strongest contributions, as their own medical staff had done tremendous work before and 
after the Concussion Summit the League had hosted.  He stated that this is helpful not only to the 
understanding of concussions and the treatment of the players on the field, but also to youth 
football players (Legal, 2009).   
Despite Goodell’s attempt to spin all of these statements as good things, all of his 
comments were laced with controversy.  It was widely known that the NFL’s medical staff and 
MTBI committee was controversial (Fainaru-Wada & Fainaru, 2013), but Goodell continued to 
reference their research anyway.  Much of the reasoning for this was their denial of CTE’s 





Recently, a number of media stories have been published about a condition known as 
CTE – chronic traumatic encephalopathy…How susceptible athletes and others are to this 
condition, and the precise causes and contributing factors, are issues for scientists and 
doctors to study and decide.  It is fair to assume that head trauma may play a 
role…Whatever its incidence, CTE is not limited to football players, but is instead a 
broader public health issue that needs to be recognized as such.  For out part, we want to 
encourage and contribute to that research (Legal, 2009). 
Once again, he addressed the issue but did not take responsibility for it.  He said it “may play a 
role” (Legal, 2009), but without actually admitting that football can definitely cause head trauma, 
Goodell tried to minimize the NFL’s role in the long-term health issues the former players were 
facing.  But, by acknowledging at least the possibility of a link, Goodell was able to use the NFL 
as the leader in the research going forward, making it appear as if they were making corrective 
actions for the health of the sport and those who play it.   
He concluded his statement by making very rhetorical and non-directive statements 
saying that “more can be done for the retired players” (Legal, 2009), but did not explain what or 
how they were going to do that.  The one promise he did make was that their already existing 
pensions and 88 Plan would not change; therefore, they would not lose anything they already had 
based on any new programs the League would potentially create.  Goodell made it seem like 
there was a corrective action by pointing out the compensation that former players were able to 
receive (only if they had ALS), but he also gave no real direction and only promised to not make 
any changes to plans that were already insufficient for many, many players.   
 As the panel was unsatisfied with the opening statement, the testimony took a turn when 




corrective actions that had been taken, the committee challenged him to stand by the League’s 
policies and research.  In fact, Congresswoman Linda Sanchez asked Goodell to read a specific 
part from the pamphlet they had distributed to the players and team personnel in the fall of 2007.  
This part was none other than the controversial statement that said “current research had not 
shown that repeated concussions lead to permanent problems” (Fainaru-Wada & Fainaru, 2013).  
Following his reading, she went on the offensive, saying, “the NFL has this kind of blanket 
denial or minimizing the fact there may be this link” (Fainaru-Wada & Fainaru, 2013; Legal, 
2009).  She then compared them to Big Tobacco, saying the NFL had done similar strategies that 
they did in the 1990’s.  Goodell responded with, “Well, Congresswoman, I do believe that we 
have embraced the research, the medical study of the issue.”  He committed to the research, what 
they had specifically done, but blatantly ignored and denied the connection between football and 
long-term head trauma.  This continued throughout Goodell’s testimony – as the committee 
pressed him to admit to a connection, he would not admit to one (Legal, 2009).  Instead he got 
personal, attempting to show how he, on behalf of the League, truly did care about the issue.  He 
responded at one point by saying, “I can think of no issue to which I’ve devoted more time and 
attention than the health and well-being of our players, and particularly retired players” (Legal, 
2009).  While clearly meant as a positive statement about the NFL’s commitment to player 
safety, Goodell’s comment seems less than fully genuine. 
Following the disaster that was Goodell’s testimony, the NFL sent out a press release and 
memo announcing a “stricter statement on return-to-play following concussions” (Raffel, 2009).  
Announced to NFL teams by Goodell, it was meant to be a supplement to the statement and 
pamphlet from 2007 that encouraged a conservative approach on return-to-play policies that 




supplement was developed by a group of doctors, medical experts, the NFLPA, and “the NFL’s 
medical committee on concussions” (Raffel, 2009).  Using corrective action and bolstering 
strategies, Goodell tried to encourage knowledge and health within the League but also made the 
formal press release for the external audiences to know they were making changes.  Notable here 
is the fact that they did not refer to it as its proper title, the Mild Traumatic Brain Injury 
Committee.  The MTBI committee had a very poor reputation due to its over-influenced research 
and publications.  So not only did Goodell need to distance the NFL from the committee, he 
needed to remove it altogether if he was going to improve the League’s image.  
This is further illustrated when Goodell and the League attempted to make another 
corrective action by trying to “distance itself from its tumultuous past regarding concussions” 
after they announced changes to the Mild Traumatic Brain Injury Committee (Schwarz, 2010b).  
First, they changed the committee’s name to the Head, Neck, and Spine Committee.  Second, 
they removed the controversial Dr. Pellman from the committee and named two new co-
chairmen who both had backgrounds and experience in neurological surgery.   
These changes achieved two major outcomes for the NFL.  First, despite it being the 
same committee with the same goals, the NFL attempted to create a separation and give the 
committee a fresh start through the name-change.  All of the controversial research that was 
published in the years leading up to this would be associated with the MTBI committee, rather 
than this non-controversially-named committee.  Second, and in relation to that, the name-
change also implied a growth in their knowledge on the subject.  After further research, they 
knew that the neck and spine were much more relevant to brain trauma, and they could use more 
of the expertise of some of their committee members (Schwarz, 2010b).  This showed they were 




football and head trauma because of the lack of available evidence.  As long as they were making 
improvements, then they could continue with using their excuse that “more work needs to be 
done.”   
The following year, the NFL released a poster that was hung in locker rooms for the 
players and coaches to see that included much more direct language than in the information that 
had been previously handed out (Poster, 2010).  The newly renamed Head, Neck, and Spine 
Committee spearheaded the creation of the poster with the full support of Goodell after he told 
the members the League “needed to be the leaders” in the medical research (Poster, 2010).  The 
poster was noted as being “by far the NFL’s most definitive statement on the cognitive risks of 
football” (Schwarz, 2010a) and contained the most “up-to-date scientific” evidence regarding 
concussions.  The poster listed four subjects: “Concussion Facts,” “Concussion Symptoms,” 
“Why Should I Report My Symptoms?,” and “What Should I Do If I Think I’ve Had a 
Concussion?” (Poster, 2010).  Notably missing from the poster was the controversial quote 
regarding current research that was noted above.  It also warned players that repeated 
concussions “can change your life and your family’s life forever” (Schwarz, 2010a).  However, 
the poster did not directly state what the change might be, carefully eluding any direct, causal 
connection that concussions caused by playing in the NFL do result in long-term damage to the 
brain.  
The poster was redesigned a few months later, making it cleaner and more professional-
looking (NFL, 2010).  The new poster had the title “Concussion” larger and bolder, almost 
yelling what its intention was, making it impossible to miss.  The text exactly the same as the 
previous poster, save for the addition of one line under the “Why” section.  This sentence, which 




“Your brain is the most vital organ in your body” (NFL, 2010).  This poster, while now 
displayed in the NFL’s locker rooms, was also distributed to young athletes in the California area 
and made available through the Centers for Disease Control (NFL, 2010).    
This poster was another example of the NFL’s corrective action and denial strategies the 
League and the committee used from Goodell’s direction.  That is, they continued to separate the 
NFL from the previous committee by being harsher and acknowledging a potential connection, 
but they still chose to use their faulty and biased science.  Though it was good information for 
the players to have, it was not complete because of the NFL’s insistence on the refusal to admit 
to a connection.  Also, because of that refusal, the former players were still ignored, and the 
actual action did not help repair the League’s image. 
Conclusion 
Much of this time period can be summed up by my previous statement: the information 
was good for the players to have because it contained some useful information they previously 
had not known or received, but because the NFL was so insistent on directly denying or 
minimizing the connection between football, head trauma, and long-term brain health, the 
current players were still only receiving some of the important information.  Goodell, as the 
leader of the NFL, appeared to make proactive steps to improve the safety of players on the field 
and gave them some information to help them when they were off the field, but much of this was 
based on their own, flawed science.   
This information was also controversial because it was directed at the players and team 
personnel.  Goodell continued to focus on helping the current players rather than finding 
legitimate ways to help the former players.  Each moment a denial was made was another 
moment Goodell told the former players that their health issues were not caused by their sport, 




to die in strange ways and class action lawsuits were being filed, Goodell would start reaching 
out to the former players to figure out how to help them.  Unfortunately, this could be seen as an 
admittance to the link and doing that opened them up to legal liabilities from those former 
players.  This was not an option to a bottom-line-minded man like Goodell, so the NFL instead 
supported them through strictly-ruled payouts and empty rhetoric.  That was as far as Goodell 
was willing to go.   
This understandably did not bode well for Goodell or the League going forward.  More 
players did die and more were diagnosed with CTE, with many of them and their families feeling 
that Goodell and the League had forgotten them (Goodell, 2012a).  This was a new issue for 
Goodell and one that would transition into another rissue.  As more former players died, families 
asked themselves whether or not they should let their children play the sport (Deford, 2012; 
Fainaru-Wada & Fainaru, 2013).  This was a nightmare for Goodell and something that he was 
going to need to address before the League’s image was tarnished in more ways.  With an 
impending collective bargaining agreement the NFL and the NFL Players Association were 
working on set to take over the NFL’s media coverage throughout 2011, Goodell and the League 
would be able to find a way to address their image in different, and hopefully, more effective 
ways.  Indeed, Goodell did switch image repair strategies in 2012 and would continue to follow 
these same strategies for four years.  Rather than addressing the situation and the people that 
started the entire crisis, his rhetoric widely emphasized the great work the League was doing.  
However, during this next time period, he began to address external audiences including fans and 





Chapter 3:  
2012-2015: Improving the Science for the Military and the Future of Football 
 
 Throughout 2011, much of the discussion surrounding the NFL was focused on the 
Collective Bargaining Agreement between them and the NFLPA (Rosenthal, 2011).  Because the 
NFL season depended on that agreement, players, fans, and the media were concerned with little 
else.  In a way, this was beneficial to Goodell and the League because this allowed them time to 
reflect and revamp their messaging.  As Hoffman and Ford wrote (2010), organizational crises 
can be a long-term process, so many strategies may be used throughout the crisis repair.  Due to 
this long-term process, organizations must be able to adjust to multiple audiences and their 
responses.  Throughout the first time period, I argued that Goodell and the League attempted to 
use Benoit’s image repair theories of denial and reducing the offensiveness of the act to repair 
their organizational image but failed to do so because their messaging was directed to the wrong 
audience and lacked appropriate information.  I will now argue that from 2012 through 2015, 
Goodell and the NFL adjusted their strategies to Benoit’s evading responsibility and corrective 
action as they continued to address the wrong audiences and attempted to repair their 
increasingly damaged image.  
As the crisis evolved and other related issues arose that compounded the crisis, the image 
repair strategies had to change as well.  No longer fully denying the link between concussions 
and long-term health problems, Goodell instead began eluding the connection by using 
defeasibility, a strategy specific to Benoit’s evading responsibility.  This strategy is used when 
outright denying can no longer be used, but they still cannot or do not want to admit any sort of 
responsibility for the crisis at hand (Benoit, 1995).  For Goodell, admitting to the concussion link 
could mean legal liability, but continuing to act as if they had zero responsibility in the situation 




lack of information or science to fully provide answers to players’ health issues.  However, he 
also used Benoit’s corrective action to keep the conversation moving forward, showing 
everything they had done through bolstering strategies and values advocacy (NFL Health, 2012, 
2013, 2014, 2015).  Specifically, Goodell and the NFL promised to take action to correct the 
safety problems in the game and did this by donating money to research groups to improve the 
science related to head trauma and creating partnerships with outside organizations (NFL Health, 
2012, 2013, 2014, 2015; National, 2012; U.S. Army, 2012).  Both of these things were done with 
the intention of making the game safer for their players, which in a way supported their claims 
that the present information was not complete.  The money and the efforts the League put forth 
were beneficial, but the messaging behind them was an attempt to help the League’s image. 
Also during this time period, patterns in Goodell’s rhetoric emerged that gave the 
impression that he was insincere and his statements were rehearsed.  Goodell did this throughout 
many of his documents, repeatedly using words like “work” and “priority” to convey the NFL’s 
efforts throughout the concussion crisis (Breslow, 2013; King, 2015; NFL Health, 2012, 2013, 
2014, 2015; Goodell, 2012a; National, 2012; NFL, 2013a; Goodell, 2012b; Oconnell, 2015; 
Smith, M. D., 2013; U.S. Army, 2012).   This repetition gave Goodell a common theme that 
audiences would hopefully remember, slowly influencing their opinions each time those specific 
words were heard.  However, I will argue this strategic type of rhetoric failed to improve the 
NFL’s image because, along with other strategies, Goodell’s overall message lacked direction 
and too often seemed disingenuous and opportunistic.   
Goodell’s rhetorical strategies in this second time period also showed a significant shift 
into whom the messaging was directed: external audiences, specifically fans and media.  As his 




external audiences were less likely to hear of the improvements the League was making.  
Nevertheless these external audiences continued to hear about the deaths of former players.  To 
ensure these audiences received the new messages, Goodell, continuing to be the main 
spokesperson and controller of all messaging, used this combination of messaging to reach them.  
However, the League faced problems from the beginning because they continued to use their 
own controversial researchers, continued to ignore the former players’ problems, and, again, 
never apologized for what happened to the former players during their playing careers.  In what 
follows, I show how Goodell used a combination of evading responsibility, corrective action, and 
bolstering to attempt to improve the League’s image, and then argue they ultimately failed 
because of their shortcomings regarding the former players. 
Worsening the Crisis   
 Goodell’s strategic responses came later in August 2012, timed just as football season 
across all levels began in the United States.  In under a month, the NFL announced a health and 
safety website, emailed a letter to fans, created their first annual health and safety report, and 
announced partnerships, all in relation to player health and safety.  Many of the documents and 
statements were impeccably timed, some immediately following very negative announcements 
related to the NFL.  Timing played a role in another way, as this month of formal announcements 
by Goodell came only two months after the unified class-action lawsuit by over 2000 former 
players was filed (Avila, 2012).  Following negative press after the announcement of the lawsuit, 
they quickly put together these formal messages, one after another, hoping to quickly enhance 
their image.   
The first was the announcement of NFLEvolution.com, a health and safety website where 
visitors could find “information on the many programs, initiatives, and partnerships the NFL and 




encourage safe play at all levels of football” (Goodell, 2012b).  Goodell’s introductory letter for 
the website was for a short time immediately seen upon landing on the site’s homepage and later 
easily available through a direct link located on the same page.  His letter included the quoted 
statement above and summarized some of the efforts the League had made throughout the crisis, 
including improvements for former players and younger players.  Beyond the introductory letter, 
this informative website contained tabs titled, “To Our Fans,” “Safety for Your Kids,” “Players 
and Alumni,” “Military Partners,” “Medical Research,” and “Resource Center,” which listed 
their intention, partnerships, research, and statistics in further detail.  Nowhere on the website 
was any sort of typical information you would find on a sports website like roster, schedule, or 
highlights.  Solely used to distribute information about health and safety, this was a clear 
indicator of the NFL attempting to influence the discussion on concussions.   The website 
contained the exact information the League wanted people to know about their research and 
partnerships, stating statistics that proved their efforts had been working in lessening damage to 
football players.  Goodell depicted the League as the leader of this discussion and argued their 
“position offers an opportunity and responsibility” that they “not only accept but embrace” 
(Goodell, 2012b).  Goodell wanted their external audiences to believe the League was doing the 
right thing, so to find out exactly what that was, it was all placed in a centralized location for the 
audiences to see and read.   
A week later, Goodell wrote another letter, this time emailed to fans, specifically parents, 
about football safety.  He began the letter by saying that “the health and safety of players at all 
levels of the game is our first priority.”  He explained that “through the leadership of our NFL 
Head, Neck, and Spine Committee” they were “finding new ways to protect players, adapt to 




patterns that he had been previously using, Goodell continued his rhetorical strategy of calling 
the collective group of himself, the League, and medical experts the leaders of this initiative as 
they discovered more research, implemented it across multiple platforms and organizations, and 
ultimately, made the game safer (Goodell, 2012b).  Listing examples of various partnerships that 
had been created and the existence of NFLEvolution.com, he showed he and the League had 
taken multiple corrective actions to make the game safer.  Sending the letter to fans with the 
intent of it reaching parents showed they understood the concerns the growing issue had brought 
about, and that they would handle the issue “intelligently and delicately” going forward 
(Goodell, 2012b).  But this was also another way to bolster their image, something they would 
need to continue to do going forward. 
On August 30, 2012, the NFL filed for dismissal of the concussion litigation lawsuit 
(Rovell, 2012), but they also announced a new partnership between the League and the United 
States Army (U.S. Army, 2012).  The purpose of the partnership was identified as a “long-term 
initiative to enhance the health of its soldiers and players by sharing information, providing 
education, and engaging in discussion on concussion and health-related issues” (U.S. Army, 
2012).  Goodell’s influence was quite prevalent in many points throughout the press release, as 
many statements were made jointly between Goodell and US Army General Raymond T. 
Odierno.  Together they explained that the partnership was “built upon the mutual respect shared 
by the two organizations,” and that both organizations hold similar values, which include “pride 
and passion, dedication and determination, and an enduring belief in the power of team” (U.S. 
Army, 2012).  After discussing the importance of and ways for players and soldiers to get help 




By coming together in this historic effort, we are combining and strengthening our forces.  
As we continue to focus our efforts on encouraging safer environments, we will continue 
to celebrate the spirit of competition and determination that define our two organizations.  
Working together, we will ensure longer careers and healthier lives.  Working together, 
we all become stronger.  And working together, we have the power to make a real 
difference (U.S. Army, 2012). 
This final paragraph of the press release was something that came from the NFL, as the 
repetition throughout the last few sentences were reminiscent of Goodell’s recent and ongoing 
rhetorical strategies.  Again, the word “work” was used, but in a slightly different way.  This 
time serving as a verb, they were able to emphasize this was an ongoing process and that both 
organizations would be making these efforts together.  Again, these sentences were empty 
without real direction.  Each sentence contained a goal or intention of what the NFL and the 
Army was intending to do, but did not explain how it was going to get done.  Rhetorically, these 
sentences were empowering because these efforts were clearly going to be made together, but 
their lack of specific details left more questions than answers.   
Overall, this partnership was something that could have possibly helped the NFL’s image 
because of the value Americans place on the military.  Indeed, in a post 9-11 world, the 
intersection between sports and the military became a common thread and storyline (Silk, 2012), 
so the NFL’s partnership appeared to be a natural fit.  The NFL, as a popular group is able to rely 
on cultural pedagogies to reinforce and influence what we as a culture find important.  By 
forming this partnership with the Army, the NFL was able to support and emphasize those values 
by making them appear as if they were their own.  Goodell and the League could impress upon 




societal values, thus hoping to improve their organizational image.  With the Army’s actual 
involvement, the partnership gave the NFL positive attention because not only was this in 
conjunction with the military, but they were finally able to offer a legitimate, societal 
organization outside of their own that they were able to help.   
While a positive and beneficial partnership for both organizations, but the announcement 
of the joint venture did not help the League’s image as much as they had hoped for two reasons.  
First, the message was addressing an external audience, once again ignoring the former players.  
While useful information could be gained from the potential research that would be done and 
shared between the two organizations, there was no mention of how any of this would affect the 
former players who were already suffering.  Second, the message failed because of the timing of 
the announcement as not only did the League ignore the former players, but they did so blatantly 
by announcing the partnership the same day as the former players’ formalized legal filing.  
Whether or not any of these two organizations’ audiences approved of this partnership was lost 
as the partnership was overshadowed by the news of the legal filing.  Again, a positive step and 
corrective measure, it did nothing to repair the image of Goodell or the League. 
Shortly after this announcement, the NFL filed for dismissal of the former players’ 
lawsuit, a week later, the League issued a press release announcing a $30 million grant to the 
National Institutes of Health for research related to concussions (National, 2012).  Again, 
attempting to make a strategic action, within the statement they explained the rarity and impact 
of such a grant by naming it the NFL’s “single-largest donation to any organization in the 
League’s 92-year history” (National, 2012).  Attempting to show the leadership of the League, 




We hope this grant will help accelerate the medical community’s pursuit of pioneering 
research to enhance the health of athletes’ past, present, and future.  This research will 
extend beyond the NFL playing field and benefit athletes at all levels and others, 
including our military (National, 2012).   
 After the negative press received from the lawsuit and the League’s denouncement of the 
lawsuit, the League used different strategies to repair their faltering image.  Announcing a large 
grant was their financial way of avoiding responsibility for their previous acts because they were 
making a sort of financial restitution for the future.  Emphasizing the need for more research for 
the protection of their players, this was a way they showed they were serious about doing 
whatever they could to make the game safer going forward.  That the research benefited military 
and athletes in other sports showed fans the League was sensitive to the subject of brain trauma.   
However, announcing this when they did was another failed attempt at repairing their 
image for at least a couple reasons.  First, the research went to an institute that had doctors who 
were on the NFL payroll (Hruby, 2013).  Medical research associated with the League already 
had a negative reputation.  Previous research done by the MTBI committee had been criticized, 
and any research that had not been in line with the League’s prior messaging was ignored or 
disavowed by the NFL and their doctors (Fainaru-Wada & Fainaru, 2013).  Research that was 
done by the League was now a concern, so in acknowledging the past accusations and reputation, 
the League immediately claimed the grant would have no influence (which was later shown to be 
not true).  Second, this announcement came immediately following the negative press they 
received from the dismissal filing, but once again, the announcement did not directly affect the 




 The final strategic message of 2012 came in the first-ever annual NFL Health and Safety 
Report (NFL Health, 2012).  Starting in 2012, the League began issuing annual reports, typically 
around the start of football season, that contained information about multiple aspects of player 
health and safety including everything from head trauma to ankle problems.  The 2012 report 
came out after the concussion-media blitz noted above, but was a sort of way to wrap everything 
they had done up in a nice and neat little package.  From 2012 going forward, each yearly report 
started with an introductory letter from Goodell (similar to that of the letter on 
NFLEvolution.com) and offered a section called “NFL Health and Safety by the Numbers” 
summarizing player health and safety as its purpose.  Within each of these reports was 
information about their partnerships, adding to each annual report as more were made, briefly 
giving background information and the positive results that came from each partnership (NFL 
Health, 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015).   Essentially, this report functioned as a summary of all of the 
corrective actions Goodell and the League had made.  This document provided one-sided 
examples of everything good they had done, including the controversial research their own 
doctors produced, in one location for anyone to read.  Health and safety statistics were listed 
without context, losing any of the negative details or constraints that may be associated with 
them.  For example, it lacked the number of undiagnosed concussions that still took players out 
of the game even for a temporary period of time.  Ranging anywhere from 32-52 pages long, 
these annual reports were again used to bolster the League’s image by showing the corrective 
actions they had made. As long as they were continuously making new partnerships, they 
continued to evade responsibility by emphasizing that more work would always need to be done.   
Goodell and the NFL started 2013 with an incredibly insensitive message after receiving 




Junior Seau was perhaps one of the “greatest linebackers” to play in the NFL and “beloved 
across the League when he retired in 2010” (Elwood, 2015).  In the spring of 2012, he committed 
suicide by shooting himself in the chest, leaving his brain unharmed.  A shock to many, this was 
the highest profile case among the players who committed suicide, putting the crisis on a new 
level (Isidore, 2013).   
Following his death, stories were told of him doing uncharacteristic things like 
withdrawing from family, drinking excessively, and gambling large amounts of money, similar 
to stories of other deceased former players who were found to have suffered from CTE (Smith, 
S., 2013).  After scientists at the NIH tested his brain, they determined that he did, in fact, suffer 
from CTE (Pilon & Belson, 2013).  Following an announcement made by the NIH, the NFL 
released a short statement that only briefly touched on the conclusions of the testing.  After 
thanking the Seau family for their cooperation with the testing, the NFL immediately tried to 
avoid the possibility of being blamed for Seau’s decline and eventual suicide stating, “The 
finding underscores the recognized need for additional research to accelerate a fuller 
understanding of CTE” (NFL, 2013a).  Placed as the second sentence of a five sentence 
statement, the NFL immediately showed they were unwilling to take any blame for his downfall.  
That their lack of sympathy proved they were more concerned about their perceived image than 
the actual results was evident with this statement.  Explicitly calling for more research continued 
their strategy of evading responsibility and showed that despite the number of former players 
who were or were going to be diagnosed with CTE, the League still needed more information 
before they would admit a connection. 
 Within this short statement, a sentence about the amount of money they had donated to 




included.  The mention of the CBA was the only brief moment they addressed the former players 
as some part of the agreement did include money that would go towards retired players and 
health issues they could face (NFL, 2013a).  Simply though, the audiences were just reminded of 
the money the League was giving for research going forward.  Serving as a reminder of the steps 
they had taken since Goodell became commissioner, the NFL did not want people to correlate 
Seau’s issues with the League.   
 The five-sentence release concluded with a final statement: “We have work to do, and 
we’re doing it” (NFL, 2013a).  An insensitive statement to end a release that was regarding the 
health of a man before his suicide, Goodell finalized it with a meaningless phrase.  Appearing as 
a corrective action, Goodell offered no meaning or direction for what this would actually mean.  
The word “work” offered an endless number of possibilities but no definition.  Instead, it 
continued to be a common and repetitive theme throughout Goodell’s strategic rhetoric that 
joined past statements and would continue going forward. 
 Again, around the start of football season, in August 2013, the NFL announced a new 
program called “Moms Football Safety Clinics” that were adopted and implemented by teams 
throughout the NFL (NFL Evolution, 2014).  These clinics were established after a new issue 
related to head trauma began to take shape.  After hearing of the potential damage football could 
cause, parents across the country were concerned and questioned whether to let their children 
play football (Belson, 2013; Fainaru-Wada & Fainaru, 2013).  In fact, even President Obama, 
who did not have sons, said he would not let those hypothetical children play football (Breech, 
2014).  Knowing this issue could affect the health of the League into the future, Goodell 
established these clinics to provide helpful information to moms who have children who are 




fitting, concussion awareness lectures and the heads up tackling technique as well as 
participating in on-field drills” (NFLFoundation.com, 2016).  Through these clinics, mothers 
received hands on knowledge, learning themselves how to play the game safely to encourage 
their children to do the same (Belson, 2015).  A different type of corrective action, it was a way 
Goodell could address this new issue that was a part of the ever-growing concussion crisis, and 
attempt to ensure that another generation of players and fans continued to grow their multi-
billion dollar organization (Belson, 2015; Bell, 2014).  These clinics were hosted by several 
teams with current and retired players serving as trainers and coaches.  Goodell was even present 
and participating at many of them (Belson, 2015).  Being present was a way he could ensure fans 
knew he actually cared about the health of those who were playing the sport. 
 Shortly after, Goodell and the League announced another hands-on and long-term 
partnership with GE called the Head Health Challenge, which was designed to “accelerate 
concussion research, diagnosis, and treatment.”  A five-year competitive program, it “aims to 
improve the safety of athletes, members of the military, and society overall” (About, 2016).  
Throughout the next couple of years, the organizations announced different challenges to create 
programs or products to help with various parts of brain trauma.  These included methods for 
diagnosis and prognosis of mild traumatic brain injuries, innovative approaches for preventing 
and identifying brain injuries, and advanced materials for impact mitigation – all programs with 
results intended for use by those currently playing the sport.   
After the winners of the first challenge was announced, Goodell commented, “These 
studies hold the promise of advancing brain science in important ways.  The health and safety of 
our players is our top priority, and this challenge extends that commitment to the general 




a statement that sounded good but was again empty.  First, the word “priority” was another 
repetitive term he used throughout this period and always in reference to advancing the science 
(Breslow, 2013; NFL Commissioner, 2015; Oconnell, 2015; Smith, M.D., 2013).  This word 
placed the players’ health above making money, because their science would improve the safety 
of the players.  Second, though the program is in part spearheaded by the NFL, the science and 
technology gained from it would benefit more than football players, something that Goodell has 
repeatedly emphasized throughout this time period including in the partnership with the Army 
(U.S Army, 2012).  As this is a corrective action for player health and safety, it again fails in 
repairing their image because it does not help the former players who already had brain trauma.  
The League even encouraged scientists outside of their payroll to advance the science, but once 
again it would only help the science in the future, doing nothing to treat what had already 
happened. 
Also in August 2013, Goodell continued their image repair strategy with a letter to fans 
and parents by “touting the League’s record on safety” (Breslow, 2013).  This letter was quite 
possibly in response to the publishing of two excerpts from the book, League of Denial (2013). 
The book itself was published later in October, but these two excerpts alone were controversial 
and shocking enough to cause concern for Goodell and the NFL.  In conjunction with PBS’s 
Frontline, both the book and documentary heavily detailed the controversy and the League’s 
response to football’s concussion crisis (Breslow, 2013).  In Goodell’s letter, the financial 
contributions and partnership-bolstering continued, reminding or making fans aware of the newly 
announced $60 million partnership with GE and Under Armour (who joined on shortly after the 
initial announcement) along with the $30 million donation to the NIH as a part of the $100 




other than professional football players was also mentioned when Goodell said their “actions 
influence college, high school, and youth football.”  He also stated the League would continue to 
be an “advocate for safety in all sports…[to] support the health and well-being of NFL players 
and athletes at all levels” (Breslow, 2013).     
The letter also addressed another issue that had taken form as health and safety became 
the League’s priority.  Throughout Goodell’s early years, he made rule changes to encourage 
safer on-field play.  Unfortunately, some felt Goodell and the League were removing a key 
element of the game: the brutality (Bledsoe, 2015; King, 2016a; Smith, 2010; Vivona, 2016).  
This feeling grew with each new rule change and it was something Goodell, who was a fierce fan 
and protector of the game (Vrentas, 2016), addressed in this letter.  His line-straddling rhetoric 
began almost immediately, 
It includes a commitment to deliver the game that the fans love and the safety that players 
deserve.  As a League, we have an unwavering commitment to player health and making 
our game safer at all levels.  This is, and will remain, our top priority (Breslow, 2013). 
Addressing both the “sport is not tough anymore” and the “sport is too dangerous” audiences, 
Goodell tried to appeal to both by showing he valued both of their opinions.  After listing the 
number of rule changes, financial contributions to science, and various other ways they were 
helping the game, he concluded the letter by saying, “Football will remain the hard-hitting, 
physical sport that you love.  And we will continue to be vigilant in seeking ways to make the 
game even better and safer” (Breslow, 2013).  By beginning and finishing the letter with this 
sentiment, Goodell attempted to address another issue that was gaining traction within the 
concussion crisis, and one he probably personally cared more about, while not trying to seem 




had done while letting fans know that they were in a transition period in making improvements 
on various levels of the game.  Whether or not this transition period ends for the NFL remains to 
be seen. 
 Other than these sorts of repeated strategies, 2014 was marked with controversy for 
Roger Goodell.  He received criticism for his handling of two domestic violence issues and his 
apparent terrible and unfair judgments throughout both (King, 2014b).  The first case involved 
Baltimore Ravens running back Ray Rice who hit his girlfriend in an elevator and dragged her 
out of it on Valentine’s Day.  Goodell suspended Rice for only two games which immediately 
received criticism (Key, 2014).  He defended himself, but shortly thereafter the League 
announced a new personal conduct policy that initiated an immediate six-game suspension or 
longer for violators of the policy (Almasy & Nichols, 2014).  What appeared to be an 
acknowledgment of his leniency before, Goodell attached a letter that acknowledged his prior 
mistake regarding Rice (Key, 2014).  Within the letter he wrote, “I didn’t get it right.  Simply 
put, we have to do better.  And we will” (Almasy & Nichols, 2014). 
Shortly after Goodell’s new policy had been instated, Minnesota Vikings running back 
Adrian Peterson was arrested for child abuse after repeatedly hitting one of his sons with a tree 
branch, which Peterson characterized as a disciplinary whipping (Bieler, 2014).  After missing 
nine of the Vikings’ first ten games of the 2014 season, Goodell and the NFL suspended 
Peterson without pay for the remaining six games (King, 2014b).  Considered to be a bit 
shocking, this was in coordination with Goodell’s newly announced Personal Conduct Policy 
(King, 2014b).  Both instances, relative in nature because of their off-the-field actions, were 
disciplined in completely different ways by the man who dealt out punishments for all players, 




and many of the League’s audiences wanted him to resign.  Even some in his most supportive 
audience, the individual team owners, felt his job was safe, but knew his credibility was damaged 
(King, 2014a).  Underlying all of this were the continued efforts to make the game safer that had 
been started in 2013, but the discussion regarding concussions remained relatively secondary.  
However, once the unrelated crises calmed down, the health and safety of players and former 
players remained, forcing Goodell to continue the image repair.  A sort of distraction from the 
other negative attention, he used this rhetoric to remind people of all of the positive partnerships, 
science, and work that had been done to help the players on the field. 
 Insisting on talking about “where the League is going, not where it’s been” (King, 2015), 
Goodell continued his strategy of talking about the great things the League was doing for the 
health and safety of players, while avoiding talking about the health of former players.  In an 
“edited” interview with Peter King in early 2015, Goodell was asked about his reaction to player 
Chris Borland’s recent decision to retire early because of his concern for his future health.  
Specifically, King wanted to know whether or not he thought that incident would have an impact 
on parents’ concerns regarding the sport.  Goodell never actually answered the question; rather 
he immediately began bolstering his and the League’s record of handling the crisis, 
We’ve been working on the safety of our game throughout our history – with an 
incredible focus on it during my personal time as commissioner…1We’ve seen a 
reduction of concussions by 25 percent just last year.  That’s continuing a three-year 
trend on that issue (King, 2015). 
Rather than addressing the Borland issue in any way, he evaded by stating that many 
improvements had been made.  He also continued by stating something he believed was 
                                                          




important for people to know, “NFL players are living longer than the average American male” 
(King, 2015).  Though there were some health issues, those who made it to the professional level 
actually had a longer life-span – he just failed to acknowledge that some of those lives were 
wrought with horrible problems.   
King (2015) pressed the question simply by stating, “But you obviously see the stories of 
the broken-down old player.”  Once again, Goodell avoided the question by discussing the 
benefit of the rule changes and additions that he had made.  He also included that many former 
players had told him they wish those rules had been in place when they played.  He continued to 
King, “So I think you’re overlooking a lot of the improvements that have taken place – not just 
in the medical, but in the fields and the rules and the training.”  Once again, he did not answer 
King’s question, but evaded any responsibility by shifting the blame onto King for not knowing 
enough about their programs. 
Later in the interview, King specifically asked Goodell where the League hoped to go 
during 2015, following the previous tumultuous year.  Goodell spoke of the corrective action 
they were doing to make the game safer, strategically placing words throughout his response to 
emphasize the efforts the League had taken. 
Well, to some extent, it’s that the things that we’re doing are working.  The changes that 
we’re making to the game are making it better and safer.  The changes that we’re making 
to our policies to keep our stadiums full are working…We need to continue to work at it.  
You can’t get complacent.  It’s working.  The changes that we’re making to our personal 
conduct policy are working…We’re seeing the quality of the game continue to improve 
to be safer.  So it’s working…The work that we’re doing in youth football, as I said, the 




are the kinds of positive changes that are [coming] because of a lot of the efforts that 
we’ve all made…The expectations of the NFL continue to rise, whether they’re internal 
or external (King, 2015). 
Bolstering the League’s changes, Goodell rhetorically glossed over the good things he and the 
League has done to make the game safer.  Again, using repetition, he used the word “work” to 
emphasize what the League had and were doing in the field and that this work was important to 
them.  And, by addressing expectations of their fans, he emphasized the importance and value 
they held in their audiences’ opinions.  However, without these audiences’ support, the League 
would suffer going forward.   
Conclusion 
 Throughout the rest of this time period, Goodell and the NFL used the same messages 
they had previously used, but they annually updated many of them with the new developments 
that had been implemented.  Each year an annual health and safety report went out, a new 
competition in their health initiative was announced, and more letters were written and sent to 
fans.  And, each year these messages all contained updates of the great things the NFL had done 
to encourage the research and improve the science of head trauma.  What is important 
rhetorically is that Goodell was able to take many opportunities to draw similar conclusions: no 
matter where they had been and where they were currently, there would always be a need for 
more research.  This is why he so often used Benoit’s image repair strategies of evading 
responsibility and corrective action.  As the spokesperson of the League, Goodell stood in as the 
League’s representation, stating empty sentences that on the surface appeared to be positive, but 
lacked substance or any real direction for the audience to follow.  Frequently, he claimed there 
was a “need for more research” or a need for more ways to address the compounding issues 




his claim that there was a lack of existing information regarding concussions and long-term brain 
trauma, he and the League were able to evade responsibility in the crisis.  To enhance this, he 
again repeatedly listed steps the League had taken to improve the science, but listed efforts put 
forth towards the external audience, specifically by appealing to their values.     
Throughout this time period, he also strategically repeated specific words.  The word 
“work” signified an ongoing action – the League had been working on the problem and would 
continue to do so because there had been success (U.S. Army, 2012; Breslow, 2013; Smith, 
M.D., 2013; NFL, 2013a).  The word itself also served as a sort of one-word combination of his 
evading responsibility and corrective action strategies.  As long as there was science that needed 
to be discovered, the League cannot be held responsible for any brain trauma or degenerative 
disease that is discovered.  However, they would continue to do this important work for the 
betterment of the game and health of the players.  He also uses this word and other words like 
“priority” (Goodell, 2012a; Goodell, 2012b; National, 2012; Breslow, 2013; NFL, 2013a; 
Oconnell, 2015) and “leading role” (Smith, M.D., 2013; NFL Health, 2015), when discussing 
player health and safety and research across multiple documents and speeches.  Repetition holds 
“certain persuasive consequences” and, specifically, “has undoubted rhetorical force” 
(Fahnestock, 2011).  Using these repeatedly signifies the specific goals of Goodell’s rhetoric.  
Not to be mistaken, similar language was used during the first time period, but not as frequently 
as the main focus then was distribution of information to the players and team personnel.  
Unfortunately for Goodell, throughout this second time period, his empty sentences continued to 
alienate both audiences and produce more personal issues that had to be addressed within this 




I believe this type of stale, strategic, repetitive rhetoric slowly damaged Goodell’s own 
reputation throughout the first nine years of Goodell’s tenure as commissioner.  As previously 
mentioned, 2014 brought about new crises that also tarnished his reputation, going so far as to 
having people question whether or not he should be the commissioner any longer (Arthur, 2014).  
This question never really went away, as Goodell was not trusted by many of his audiences.  
Surprisingly, in 2016, the League stopped flat-out denying the relationship between football and 
long-term brain trauma and even admitted there actually is a connection (Fainaru, 2016).  They 
continued to make changes to improve the science of the field, but they never acknowledged or 
apologized to the players who were suffering and dying.  As a result, the image of the NFL never 
improved and Goodell’s own personal reputation worsened.  However, rather than solely 
focusing on the League’s image, the League (specifically the team owners) decidedly do less, 
and instead began to focus on fixing Goodell’s personal image.  This, I will argue, did little to fix 
his reputation and little to fix the League’s image for many of their audiences.  Unfortunately, for 






Chapter 4:  
2016: Repairing the Leader’s Image 
 
 As I have discussed in the two previous chapters, Goodell and the League had been 
criticized for their mishandling of the concussion crisis and many of the issues within it.  While 
this hurt the League’s image, Goodell’s own personal reputation faltered as well, with fans and 
media questioning whether he would keep his position as the commissioner (King, 2014; Babb, 
2016; King, 2016b; Vrentas, 2016).  Considered to be “obstinate, heavy-handed, and overpaid,” 
a public-policy poll found that “only 19% of self-described NFL fans had a favorable opinion of 
Goodell” (Kaplan, 2016).  That he was not liked by these external audiences never truly had an 
effect on his career; Goodell never lost the support of the owners because of the increasing 
profits for which he had largely been credited (Babb, 2016; Bedard, 2016; Vrentas, 2016).  
However, following years of intense scrutiny from the media and many others on social media, 
his biggest supporters knew his image needed an overhaul (Kaplan, 2016; Vrentas, 2016).  In this 
chapter, I argue that in 2016, Goodell and the League continued to use the same bolstering 
strategies that were used during the second time period (2012-2015) related to the concussion 
crisis.  However, the significant change in the image repair strategies was that not only were they 
trying to fix the League’s image but also Goodell’s personal reputation. 
 Unfortunately, the League began to receive more negative attention because of Goodell’s 
handling of other crises.  As one writer described it, “the constant stumbling and bumbling by 
Goodell and the NFL office in recent years has eroded any confidence that passionate fans and 
its players have in Goodell” (Bedard, 2016).  These events included both Adrian Peterson’s and 
Ray Rice’s domestic violence cases, as well as “Deflategate.”  As previously mentioned, 
Goodell’s handling of both domestic violence cases was considered unfair and controversial.  




coined by the media that referred to the controversy that ensued following the 2015 AFC 
Championship game when the New England Patriots were accused of deflating their footballs to 
give quarterback Tom Brady an unfair advantage (Nocera, 2016).  Goodell investigated and dealt 
a harsh punishment, despite the fact much of the evidence was circumstantial.  However, as this 
was the second time in recent memory that the Patriots had been accused of cheating, “it was 
made clear to the commissioner that there would be repercussions for him if he went too easy on 
the Patriots” (Nocera, 2016).  Goodell fought the Patriots for over 500 days, eventually winning 
after the courts backed his decision to suspend Brady for four games of the 2016 season 
(ESPN.com, 2015).  Although he won, many saw Goodell’s behavior as that of a power-hungry 
leader (Hurley, 2016; Vivona, 2016). 
Of course, also included in the sentiment that people no longer trusted Goodell was his 
handling of the concussion crisis and the legal litigation with the former players (Bedard, 2016; 
Kaplan, 2016).  This consistent crisis along with his diminishing reputation never truly allowed 
the criticism of Goodell and his health-related efforts to end (King, 2016b).  The crisis even hit a 
new audience, as the story of Dr. Omalu and the NFL made its way to the silver screen in the 
movie Concussion.  Oscar-nominated actor Will Smith portrayed Dr. Omalu in the movie, which 
painted the NFL as the villain throughout the story.  This put a spotlight unlike any other on the 
concussion crisis and forced Goodell and the League to embrace the dialogue rather than ignore 
the crisis (Vrentas, 2015).   
Because of this never-ending criticism, Goodell had to continually reevaluate and 
improve their policies.  The combination of Deflategate, the “PR fiasco that was 2014” (Kaplan, 
2016), and the ongoing concussion crisis, along with other high-profile instances that occurred 




Unfortunately for Goodell and the League, it appeared that “his reputation was stuck” (Kaplan, 
2016).  However, the movie Concussion did force a new discussion, and as this subject had been 
a part of his personal mission (Kaplan, 2016), the crisis became a part of his own personal image 
repair strategy.  While Goodell never seemed personally concerned with fixing his image, the 
owners were, so they took actions in 2016 that they hoped would fix his personal reputation and 
image as the commissioner of the NFL (King, 2016a, Vrentas, 2016).   
Leadership can have a major impact on the effectiveness of an organization’s crisis 
management effort (Coombs, 2015).  The CEO or leader of an organization is important in 
helping the organization overcome the crisis because they have to set a direction as well as re-
establish confidence among stakeholders (Lucero et al., 2009).  Their “appearance will set the 
tone of engagement towards the organization’s internal and external publics,” showing the 
severity at which the organization views the crisis and “their resolve to return the situation to 
normalcy” (Lucero et al., 2009).  As I have shown, in some ways, Goodell did this correctly by 
starting the image repair process with the concussion summit not long after he became 
commissioner.  He then attempted to show their audiences that the League cared about the 
situation by taking some action throughout his first ten years as commissioner.  Through much of 
this, he appealed to the values of the external audiences and tried to shift the conversation to be 
more cohesive with their messaging.  Coombs (2015) stated that when organizations use values 
advocacy, they “attempt to influence how people prioritize their values, and to convince 
audiences that organizational values and individual values are compatible.”  Therefore, the 
organizational response becomes an attempt to mold their audiences’ beliefs to what the 




Indeed, Goodell attempted to do this, but he never completely listened to the NFL’s 
audiences regarding the health of the former players.  His consistent use of denial and 
defeasibility gradually built up, angering more people.  Unfortunately for organizations, “the 
more severe [audiences] perceive a crisis to be, the more negative are their perceptions of the 
organization’s reputation” (Claeys, A., Cauberghe, V., & Vyncke, P., 2010).  This ongoing crisis 
caused the NFL’s integrity to be questioned, thus causing the head of the League to be 
questioned as well.  In their article, “They Spoke in Defense of Themselves” (1973), Ware and 
Linkugel wrote that “an attack upon a person’s character…does seem to demand a direct 
response.  The questioning of a man’s moral nature, motives, or reputation is qualitatively 
different from the challenging of his policies.”  In the tenth year of his term as Commissioner, 
Goodell’s was personally attacked more than ever from external audiences in the news media 
and by fans on social media.  This reaction from the audiences forced Goodell to not only 
address the League’s reputation, but his own as well.   
To improve and attempt to repair Goodell’s personal image, I argue Goodell and the 
League tried to use the concussion crisis to their advantage.  As this was considered a personal 
priority and “core issue of his platform” (Kaplan, 2016), he continued to bolster what they 
believed to be their own corrective actions.  While discussing improvements for the current 
players, his messages were directed to external audiences to appeal to their values.  Part of this 
involved limiting his public appearances, making his messages more planned and calculated.  
Rather than reacting to defamatory statements, he worked in the background while letting others 
respond (Babb, 2016).  However, many formal, prepared, and proactive messages that came from 
the League had Goodell’s name attached to them.  These documents, which I detail more below, 




required any sort of denial or defeasibility came from others within the League.  To make my 
argument, I analyze a statement made by the League, a “defense” announced by the Vice 
President of Communications, a Congressional report, two memos from Goodell, and the 
announcement of a health and safety campaign.  At the time of this writing, I believe this once 
again failed for the Commissioner, because despite the fact that his appearances were limited and 
only used when positive information was being distributed, negativity still surrounded his and 
the League’s image.  These efforts were all meant to repair Goodell’s and the League’s image, 
but they failed because they still continued to ignore the health of the former players.  Instead, 
Goodell and the League put their efforts towards focusing on the future.  Much of what they 
were doing appeared to be a false, public relations campaign that people continued to not 
understand (Devineni, 2016).  While there were definitely improvements made during this year, 
the reputation of the leader gave the League another issue to deal with, thus compounding the 
crisis even more.  
A New Strategy  
This change in strategy can be pinpointed to January 2016, when Joe Lockhart was hired 
by the League (Babb, 2016).  Lockhart, President Bill Clinton’s White House Press Secretary 
during the Monica Lewinsky scandal, was brought on to be the Vice President of 
Communications for the NFL and was told his primary responsibility was to “manage the 
League’s reputation” (Kaplan, 2016).  While that covered a wide variety of subjects, his main 
task was to “repair Roger Goodell’s image” (Kaplan, 2016).  At this point in Goodell’s career it 
seemed that every time he spoke he was being criticized for it (Bedard, 2016).  Kent Babb with 
The Washington Post (2016) wrote that “his tenure has been marked by remarkable growth and 
considerable turmoil…Goodell’s public image is so poor the League office itself isn’t sure how 




playing into the criticism he had received across social media platforms (Bedard, 2016).  
Seeming to have chosen to no longer fight these perceptions held by the external audiences, at 
times he appeared to have accepted the role of villain in the NFL (Babb, 2016; Kaplan, 2016).  
To Goodell, the reputation and criticisms of “the shield” were placed even above his own 
personal reputation (Bledsoe, 2015; Kaplan, 2016).  While the owners understood and 
appreciated Goodell, they did not like the image that surrounded him (Vrentas, 2016).  So in 
understanding the need to fix both their leader’s and the organization’s image, the League 
attempted to first repair Goodell’s.   
The first true corrective action that was made in the entire concussion crisis was during a 
congressional roundtable in March 2016.  When asked about the science and whether or not the 
existence of a link existed, the NFL’s senior Vice President of health and safety responded by 
saying, “The answer to that question is certainly yes” (Fainaru, 2016).  For the first time ever, a 
senior official of the NFL acknowledged the link they long denied (Fainaru, 2016).  
Simultaneously, they disavowed all of their previous responses and actions that denied the 
connection.  Though it was not directly said by Goodell, who for years avoided answering the 
question, the NFL released a statement the following day, “The comments made by Jeff Miller 
yesterday accurately reflect the view of the NFL” (Fainaru, 2016).  As all communications and 
comments from the NFL are directed by Goodell, this statement can be read as a major change 
on his behalf.  Indeed a major step, the League acknowledged a link but did not acknowledge 
this as a possibility for the past deaths and current issues many former players were still facing, 
thus continuing to ignore the former players.  However, the lawyers of former players who had 
sued the NFL over the damaging effects of concussions to their health, began using Miller’s 




settlement some saw as too little.  The League responded by giving a nameless statement 
denouncing the letter, which in turn denounced the former players concerns about their health 
(Fainaru, 2016).   
Before Lockhart’s arrival, both of the NFL’s statements could have had Goodell’s name 
attached directly to them, prompting criticism and public outcry, but it was noticeably left off.  
Adding his name would have possibly diminished its importance in the overall image repair 
because he could have been criticized or called a hypocrite after years of denial.  Another 
example of this came shortly after an article was published by The New York Times, which ran 
with the following headline:  “NFL’s Flawed Concussion Research and Ties to Tobacco 
Industry” (Schwarz, Bogdanich, & Williams, 2016).  A long, investigative report, this article 
accused the League of using incorrect data to create many of their early CTE studies that were 
published in scholarly journals including Neurosurgery.  It also described and explained ways 
the NFL and the Tobacco Industry were tied, mostly through similar actions and people who 
helped cover up any reports of the connection between football and CTE.  Rather than letting 
Goodell respond as he typically would have before, the League itself demanded a retraction from 
the Times and Lockhart himself wrote a rebuttal letter (Lockhart, 2016).  This letter used the 
same bolstering strategies Goodell had used in the past, starting with,  
the NFL has been on the front lines supporting research, changing the rules of the sport, 
engaging in partnerships with the military, NCAA, CDC, and others, advocating for sport 
safety legislation and promoting concussion awareness all in an effort to make sports 
safer (Lockhart, 2016). 
Following the image-bashing that was The New York Times article, the League responded 




letter went on the offense as Lockhart denied some of the accusations that were made against 
them.  The claims were clearly identified by Lockhart, titling the Times’ claims as Research 
“Allegations” and Alleged “Ties.”  His own responses to those claims were titled, “The Facts 
Prove Otherwise,” in which he explained why he felt these specific parts of the Times article 
were false.  This article, which was written in true Lockhart-style (King, 2016ba), did not do 
much to repair the League’s image.  It appeared to be much like their previous attempts of denial 
with its combative and harsh tone, a knee-jerk reaction to a report.  Even though it did not come 
from Goodell, the rebuttal was consistent with previous NFL strategies, tying many of them 
together.  He finished the letter by saying, “The NFL is not the tobacco industry.  It had no 
connection to the tobacco industry.  Nor did it follow the tobacco industry playbook to conceal 
data to skew scientific research” (Lockhart, 2016).   
Unfortunately, no matter what Lockhart or Goodell said, past mistakes would continue to 
tie the League and Big Tobacco together.  The thought had been publicly addressed during the 
2009 Congressional hearings wherein Goodell arrogantly responded to this and other 
accusations.  As this comparison was still a common sentiment, it proved that little had changed 
during those seven years of organizational image repair.  Unfortunately for Goodell, he had been 
the leader of the crisis during this time, thus his reputation was upheld in a negative way.  
Though Lockhart was indeed the person responding, the League as a whole once again denied a 
claim that related to the head health of their former players.  With the integrity of Goodell and 
the League constantly in question despite the corrective actions they made for the future of the 
League, their image repair again was failing.  Audiences attributed much of the past denials to 
Goodell, and though his name was not directly attached, their negative perceptions of him and 




 This only worsened in May when a Congressional report was published, confirming an 
investigation that was published in December, 2015.  Writers from ESPN’s Outside the Lines 
wrote an article that stated the NFL had actually tried to influence $16 million of the 2012 
donation to the NIH (Fainaru & Fainaru-Wada, 2015).  Having previously called it 
“unrestricted,” Goodell and the League once again looked like they had lied and tried to 
influence science related to football and concussions (Ley, 2015).  A mere two months after 
being accused by The New York Times for using faulty science for their players’ health in the 
past, this article accused them of attempting to influence the research their donation was going 
towards (Pallone, 2016).  The report confirmed the investigation, finding that the League was 
trying to “funnel the final $16 million to another project that would involve members of the 
League’s brain injury committee” rather than it getting distributed to other independent 
researchers (Ley, 2016).  A spokesman for the NFL officially responded by rejecting the idea of 
any wrongdoing and insisted they would review the information (Fainaru, 2016).  This was quite 
reminiscent of the earlier years of NFL concussion research and their influencing of the research 
to coincide with their own messaging.  Rather than being able to tout the amount of the donation 
and information that was being gained from it, they instead were put back on the defense.  And, 
while answering an entire new round of questions and concerns, they were again denying any 
wrongdoing.  Not using his name was a smart decision for Goodell’s image, but it did not help 
the League’s image.   
Following the tumultuous first half of 2016, which included acknowledging the 
connection between football and CTE, The New York Times article, and the congressional report, 
Goodell finally made two corrective actions to repair the League’s bruised image in the form of 




from him, to inform the teams the League was going to hire a physician who would work with 
the League office on a full-time basis as the Chief Medical Officer.  The purpose of this position 
was to establish an actual practitioner who would oversee the NFL’s actions in relation to player 
health and safety, building upon initiatives that had been “designed to accelerate science, identify 
new technologies and means of preventing and treating injuries, and make our sport safer” (NFL, 
2016b).  As they felt they had already done a lot of work in this area, the memo gave Goodell 
another opportunity to remind and bolster their past actions.  This announcement allowed the 
League to establish someone to oversee their many programs and prevent them from making any 
more mistakes.  A positive message, it was an opportunity to make a corrective action without 
outright admitting they had already made numerous errors. 
Within this memo was a second major announcement that many in both the internal and 
external audiences had waited a long time to hear: the controversial Dr. Elliot Pellman had 
officially retired.  In another attempt at a corrective action, it was actually stated in the memo 
that Goodell requested Pellman retire and he accepted (Seifert, 2016).  Often, when controversial 
characters retire there may be questions as to whether or not they were forced into it or just 
outright fired.  In this case, there was absolutely no doubt.  According to ESPN, Goodell finally 
understood “that the NFL must demonstrate strong leadership on health and safety and that its 
players and fans need to trust the League” (Seifert, 2016).  For many years, Pellman was 
negatively tied into the concussion crisis, publishing controversial papers, doctoring reports, and 
encouraging players to continue playing while seriously injured.  After years of criticism, 
audiences questioned why he was still involved with the League, especially after the football and 
head trauma acknowledgement earlier in 2016, which he directly disagreed with (Draper, 2016; 




did not listen to them (King, 2016a) and had his own agenda.  Finally, it seemed Goodell 
understood the perception and made this corrective action.  Unfortunately, while a positive step 
in the overall concussion crisis, it still did not address the former players.  There was no 
comment about Pellman’s past discretions, “scientific research,” or mishandling of funds.  
Goodell acknowledged the existence of a negative perception but did not acknowledge the basis 
of the perception.  The subtle bolstering showed Goodell made the corrective action for the 
League, but because the discretions had gone on for so long, this was only a small step and 
audiences were still hesitant to trust the NFL.   
A short five days later, the NFL and the NFLPA together announced a new policy to 
enforce concussion protocol during games (NFL, 2016a).  This policy, which was designed to 
“focus on enforcing game-day concussion protocol,” gave Goodell “full discretion over 
disciplinary action for violations” (Fitzgerald, 2016).  Disciplinary actions were listed, including 
a requirement of violating team members to attend educational classes and fines for teams who 
violated or encouraged the violation.  If teams repeatedly broke these protocols, Goodell had full 
rights to determine what appropriate discipline should be then taken.  He even was able to force 
teams to forfeit their draft picks if he believed the protocol was broken due to “competitive 
considerations” (NFL, 2016a).   
This, a corrective action done to improve the current players’ health and safety on the 
field, actually hurt Goodell’s image for two reasons.  First, this kept him side-by-side with 
owners and front office staff.  The NFLPA would not give him more power to punish the players 
if they did anything to violate it (for example, cheat on the on-field concussion protocol), but 
they conceded to let him continue working with his biggest supporters while punishing them.  




one need only look to his intensity in punishing the New England Patriots and owner/buddy 
Robert Kraft following the “Deflategate.”  However, his passion and insistence on ensuring they 
were punished led to the second problem: power.   
After Deflategate, many people including players, fans, and the media felt he was too 
power-hungry, constantly pushing and taking an increased number of steps to punish an NFL star 
and one of the most successful teams in recent years.  Through this new concussion protocol, he 
had entirely too much freedom and ability to punish the violators.  According to the release, he 
“retain[ed] sole discretion in determining penalties for violations of the game-day concussion 
protocol” (NFL, 2016a).  Guidelines were not established, which essentially gave Goodell the 
right to make up punishments as each violation occurred.  And with each violation that occurred, 
Goodell could try to say he was being fair, but the policy provided nothing to keep him in check.  
Rather than audiences seeing this as a potentially effective way to make the game safer, his 
power in punishing violators became the focus (Cosentino, 2016).  Unfortunately for Goodell, 
this was just another event that added to his reputation of being a power-hungry individual 
(Hurley, 2016; Vivona, 2016).  Already considered to be “obstinate, heavy-handed, and 
overpaid,” the commissioner’s disciplinarian style had been a major factor in hurting his 
relationship with many of his audiences (Kaplan, 2016).  Even team owners who were his 
strongest supporters felt he had begun to abuse his power (Vrentas, 2016).  Coined by Peter King 
as the “conduct commissioner” (2016), indeed he once again appeared to consider holding the 
role of sole disciplinarian a major part of his job. This protocol, while potentially effective in 
improving the health and safety of players on the field, added to the reputation of him being a 
power-craving individual that was in charge of one of the biggest and well-known organizations 




Possibly the biggest and most deliberate image repair strategy in 2016 was the 
announcement of the “Play Smart. Play Safe.” campaign.  This campaign was announced in mid-
September just as the League’s season began, and “just four months after the congressional 
investigation concluded that the League improperly influenced a major government research 
study on football and brain disease” (Devineni, 2016).  On the day of the announcement, Goodell 
appeared on various networks including The Today Show and had his own introductory letter for 
the program published in The Wall Street Journal, as well as the program’s website, 
PlaySmartPlaySafe.com (2016).   By doing these interviews and publishing the information 
across multiple platforms, he bolstered his new program to multiple audiences.  A clear public 
relations move, Goodell was using this program to improve his own and the League’s image.  
This was not surprising though, as a few months before many owners were quoted as saying the 
League had a PR problem regarding player health and safety.  They felt Goodell and the League 
had made many proactive steps, but that their messaging had not been promoted enough (Gantt, 
2016).  This program would attempt to do exactly that. 
This major announcement included two key parts.  First, it included a donation of another 
$100 million to fund various forms of scientific research to improve player health and safety 
(Goodell, 2016).  Again, only a few months after the League was found guilty of tampering with 
their previous “unrestricted” donation, Goodell had to make it clear that this money and its use 
would not be influenced by the League.  In the letter, he clarified the donation would be used 
“for independent medical research and engineering advancements” (Goodell, 2016)  He also 
explained that this $100 million donation was made in addition to the previous donations, also 
worth a total of $100 million, made to advance medical research.  All of this money, Goodell 




was “keeping our players and the public informed about these important health issues” (Goodell, 
2016).  Each dollar they had spent brought new information they believed had helped the sport.  
It also just added to their never-ending collection of actions they made in attempting to remedy 
the problem without admitting there actually was a problem.   
 The second thing Goodell did in this announcement was establish four pillars on which 
the program was built: “Protecting Players,” “Advanced Technology,” “Medical Research,” and 
“Sharing Progress” (Goodell, 2016).  Throughout the letter, the purpose and goals of each pillar 
were described and included an example of one of their past partnerships or initiatives.  These 
four pillars were part of their “goal of making the game safer” and were meant to simply explain 
the progress they had already made.  These pillars were similar to the goals Goodell had 
provided before in the Congressional statement in 2009 and on NFLEvolution.com.  The 
adjustment and editing of these pillars signified a change in their goals, or rather showed how the 
goals evolved based off of the things Goodell and the League had actually done in the ten years 
leading up to this.  In this, Goodell tried to influence the audiences’ values by explaining that the 
actions he and the League had taken were good and were what the audiences should actually 
value.  However, some of these previous actions were met with criticism, which Goodell 
acknowledged in the letter when he wrote that he and the NFL “know there is skepticism about 
our work in this area” (Goodell, 2016).  But through the Play Smart Play Safe program, he was 
again prepared to provide information to change that perception. This showed that he and the 
League had taken better actions to improve the science in football, concussions, and long-term 
brain health.  The creation of the program’s website helped him do this, as Goodell and the 
League were able to place all of their corrective actions in a central and convenient location, 




 Much like the second time period, Goodell used repetition of specific words in the letter 
to emphasize and influence the reader.  Again, he used the words “priority” and “leader” 
throughout the letter as a way for the audience to see the severity in which they were taking the 
issue.  Textually, a paragraph early in the letter is one of the most interesting:  
The NFL has been a leader on health and safety in many ways, and we’ve made some 
real strides in recent years.  But when it comes to addressing head injuries in our game, 
I’m not satisfied, and neither are the owners of the NFL’s 32 clubs.  We can and will do 
better (Goodell, 2016). 
Immediately, Goodell identified the NFL as the leader throughout the last few years in this 
science, but by saying “in many ways” he conceded without actually saying that more work 
needed to be done – something he had emphasized for a long time.  However, what is most 
important for the image repair is that he then defined who “we” is: himself and the owners.   
This collective group is consistently acknowledged throughout the rest of the letter and 
initiative in general.  First, he singled himself, by saying he personally was not content with the 
work that had been done.  He then specifically identified the thirty-two owners as having the 
same feelings, thus making them an integral part of this program.  Indeed, this was the same 
group that was the largest financial stakeholder of the organization and the same group that stood 
behind Goodell during the last few years as he was ridiculed and criticized by players, coaches, 
fans, and the media (Babb, 2016; Vrentas, 2016).  Defining this group gave them all a purpose, 
which was used in an attempt to simultaneously fix both the League’s and his own image.  He 
did this by constantly repeating the efforts this specific group had put forth in the campaign.  
Unfortunately, this again failed as this same group had a reputation for being more concerned 




and the League could have been doing good things with their work, but they were not going to 
get credit for it because to many this looked like a PR campaign for both Goodell and the League 
(Devineni, 2016). 
 As with other instances in the past, the former players were mentioned in the letter and on 
the website, but only briefly.  Goodell again attempted to bolster their work with the former 
players who were already suffering and those who might in the future by commenting on their 
eagerness to implement the terms of the “historic settlement” they reached with the former 
players and their families (Goodell, 2016).  The plans put in place were listed with few details on 
the website, but the majority of the site emphasized the progress going forward.  By emphasizing 
the idea that he and the League were ready to begin paying out the lawsuit that was actually 
brought against them made it seem like they actually cared about those players rather than the 
millions of dollars they were going to lose.  But, this ridiculous statement lacked the details of 
what happened with the former players, the League, and this lawsuit.   
It seemed in 2013 that when the $765 million settlement was reached, many people 
assumed the lawsuit was over and few cared about the litigation.  In fact, when researching for 
this thesis, many websites that had extensive concussion coverage contained articles with 
timelines of concussion litigation that end with the initial settlement and are never revised (Ezell, 
2013; NFL, 2013a; Petchesky, 2013).  However, from 2013 to 2016, repeated appeals, blocks, 
and changes had been made to the settlement as the initial deal lacked actual benefits and real 
compensation for suffering retired NFL players (Barrett, 2014; Breslow, 2014; Belson, 2016).  
These repeated motions or the controversy associated with them were not mentioned in this letter 
or the website, despite the fact that much of it was still tied up in court at the time of the letter’s 




attention while announcing Goodell’s new campaign.  Instead, they chose to appear enthusiastic 
about compensating the former players without admitting they were the cause of the lawsuit. 
 The “Play Smart. Play Safe” campaign was a planned and deliberate attempt at fixing the 
League’s and Goodell’s image.  Making it about himself and the owners gave the initiative a 
personal connection that many in his audience might have seen as proactive and corrective.  The 
annual Health and Safety report even took on a slightly different tone as it came out later than 
usual, containing and emphasizing the “Play Smart. Play Safe” campaign and its initiatives.  The 
opening letter from Goodell was mostly a shortened, word-for-word version of the “Play Smart 
Play Safe” campaign letter (Health, 2016).  However, upon review, these actions were all just 
updated, new and improved versions of previous programs.  NFLEvolution.com was an early 
version of this campaign, with its website and pillars that addressed many actions the NFL had 
made to progress the science related to football, head trauma, and long-term brain health.  That 
website was ineffective and the NFL stopped updating it in 2015, not even three years after it 
was created.  It was then replaced by PlaySmartPlaySafe.com and the program’s evolved 
initiatives and pillars.  As this is early on in the program’s creation, it will be hard to tell if this 
will last much longer or do much more than the previous website.  But, one thing that was 
definitely common throughout both websites was Goodell’s image as the leader, ensuring fans 
that he was doing what he could to make the sport safer in the future.   
Conclusion 
 Goodell’s appearances in 2016 changed dramatically, having him only make 
announcements in planned ways, rather than having his name attached to reactions.  Many of his 
audiences did not like him, so having his name or image attached to any message, whether it be 
positive or negative, seemed to elicit a negative response.  Even though many of their efforts 




to bolster their efforts and make the League seem like they had made multiple corrective actions, 
the audiences continued to distrust him.  After ten years of successes and mistakes, the number 
of issues have compounded the crisis.  It seems that no matter what image repair strategies 
Goodell uses for himself or the League, his reputation as the leader of the League will never truly 






Chapter 5:  
The Future of the NFL, Roger Goodell, and the Concussion Crisis 
 
 On Monday, December 12, 2016, the Supreme Court of the United States declined to 
hear “two challenges to the estimated $1 billion settlement between the NFL and thousands of its 
former players who have been diagnosed with brain injuries linked to repeated concussions” 
(Supreme Court, 2016).  In refusing to hear the challenges, the Court put an end to the class 
action lawsuit initiated in the summer of 2011 by nearly 20,000 former players against the NFL.  
Some of those former players were likely to start receiving their payouts as early as March 2017.  
For the NFL, the lawsuit meant they “admitted no fault as part of the settlement” and, just as 
important, that they might “never have to disclose what it knew and when about the risks and 
treatment of repeated concussions” (Supreme Court, 2016).  It also meant they got off rather 
light.  As Michael McCann, writing for Sports Illustrated (2016), put it:  
While the NFL’s pledge to pay about $1 billion sounds astronomical, it is in fact a much 
more modest figure when considering two dynamics: first, the league takes in about $13 
billion a year in revenue and second, the $1 billion will be paid out over 65 years. The 
math underscores this point: $1 billion over 65 years is $15.4 million a year, a figure that 
is even less impressive when incorporating the impact of annual inflation. 
Although some former players who opted out of the class action lawsuit might still sue the NFL 
separately, the decision was, at least for the NFL, a welcome end to a long and costly legal battle.  
In fact, Brian McCarthy, the NFL’s Vice President of Communications, was the only member of 
the organization to comment on the Court’s refusal, noting rather simply that the “league was 
pleased with the decision” (Supreme Court, 2016). 
 One reason the NFL was happy the lawsuit was finally settled was because there was 




widely reported during the 2016 season, the NFL’s television ratings were down dramatically 
from the previous year, which meant decreasing advertisement revenue (Pilon, 2016).  So bad 
were things that some even began marking the year as the start of football’s decline.  As Mary 
Pilon wrote about it in the New York Post (2016), “the decline in the ratings underscores a bigger 
truth that no one wants to face: Nothing lasts forever.  And that includes the popularity of 
professional football.”  Although numerous reasons were cited for the decline—the 2016 
presidential election, changes in media consumptions and NFL players protesting police killings 
of unarmed black men—the concussion crisis was widely seen as one contributing factor (Pilon, 
2016).  Indeed, as this thesis has shown, it would be more accurate to say that Roger Goodell and 
the NFL’s mishandling of the concussion crisis was one of the reasons the League’s image had 
begun to darken. 
Review of the Findings 
After reviewing a number of documents revealing Goodell’s and the NFL’s rhetoric 
regarding the concussion crisis, I have shown that he incorrectly used a variety of messages 
targeted towards various audiences during his first ten years as commissioner.  Indeed, as the 
crisis aged, both the messaging and the audiences evolved, as Goodell had to adjust his strategies 
as expectations and situations changed.  These significant changes in strategies exposed three 
separate time periods in which Goodell’s messages had similar characteristics and patterns.  
Though it ultimately seems to have failed, all of these efforts were put forth in an attempt to 
repair the image of the NFL.  
The first time period occurred from 2007 to 2010, almost immediately after Goodell was 
voted in as commissioner.  Throughout this time period, Goodell prioritized the internal audience 
as he attempted to improve the awareness of health and safety for current players by distributing 




offensiveness of the act, and corrective action strategies (1995) to repair the League’s image 
while claiming to make the game safer.  These strategies failed for two reasons.  First, much of 
the information that was used came from the NFL’s own controversial science and doctors who 
appeared to put the best interests of the League before the actual health of the players.  Second, 
the messaging was unsuccessful because he and others within the organization blatantly denied a 
connection between football and long-term brain health, thus failing to address the health of the 
former players.  This lack of attention made it appear as if Goodell and the League no longer 
cared about those who helped build the sport and cared more so for the League’s bottom line.  
The former players were the reason the crisis had begun, yet the NFL chose to not help them as 
they were struggling or dying.   
The second time period, from 2012 to 2015, saw a dramatic change in Goodell’s rhetoric 
when discussing the concussion crisis.  After working out a new collective bargaining agreement 
in 2011 (Rosenthal, 2011), Goodell’s messaging targeted the League’s external audiences, using 
press releases, a website, and annual health and safety reports among other materials, which the 
fans and media would be more easily able to see.  Rather than outright denying the connection, 
he used evading responsibility (Benoit, 1995), specifically the defeasibility strategy, to elude the 
connection, possibly for legal litigation reasons.  He continued to use corrective action (Benoit, 
1995), but he also used the bolstering strategy (Benoit, 1995) to inform the public of the actions 
the NFL was taking in regards to overall player health and safety.  These programs and 
initiatives helped the current players, youth athletes, and the military specifically, but again, they 
failed to truly do anything for the former players.  The class action lawsuit from the former 
players began during this time period (Avila, 2012), as did the initial $765 million settlement 




delaying the payout through 2016.  As this was the only formal mention of the former players, 
Goodell’s rhetoric again failed in repairing the NFL’s image.   
The final time period, 2016, was the beginning of a completely new group of strategies as 
Goodell’s personal reputation was also in need of an overhaul.  Indeed, some of the strategies 
from the previous time periods were used again, including bolstering (Benoit, 1995), but they 
were no longer just attempting to fix the League’s image.  His connection to the delivery of the 
messages also changed, as those messages that were negative did not include his name, keeping 
him out of the public eye, while positive messages were distributed by Goodell personally.  
These messages again targeted the external audiences, hoping to show them the actions the 
League had made to help with player health and safety.  But, once again, they failed to address 
the former players in any direct way.  Unfortunately for Goodell and the NFL, despite some 
positive efforts and programs that were put forth in the field of health and safety, his continued 
lack of truly addressing the former players is what hurt their image.  After nearly ten years of 
trying everything but what was actually needed, Goodell never repaired the League’s image and, 
in fact, has potentially made it worse. 
It was Goodell’s repeated mistakes throughout these three time periods that created the 
compounding crisis for the NFL and himself.  Rather than fixing the League’s image, it 
worsened with responses to each new issue that arose.  I believe this concept of a compounding 
crisis is something that we need to further understand within the overarching ideas of 
organizational crisis and response.  Currently, we have crisis response theories that look at the 
crisis, the organizational response, and the audience response, leading us to a conclusion of the 
crisis (Coombs, 2015).  But, as is evident with the NFL, there are so many more elements that 




NFL, audiences were repeatedly unsatisfied with Goodell’s messages and actions.  Rather than 
moving on from the crisis, he constantly had to respond to the audiences’ opinions.  What is 
more, issues arose that were indirectly related to the crisis, thus demanding separate responses 
from Goodell or the League.  Each organizational response, followed by an audience response, 
followed by another organizational response created a sort of theoretical widening funnel, with 
the crisis at the base and each message looming larger and larger over top of it.  As Goodell was 
constantly the individual delivering these messages, or involved in the delivery of these 
messages, the crisis also became very much about him, not just the situation.  In this case, the 
leader had to not only defend the organization’s image and propose new solutions, but he had to 
do the same for his own personal reputation.  All of these elements, whether directly or indirectly 
related to the beginning of the initial crisis, created the massive crisis that the League is still 
having to address and will continue to do so for some time.   
It is definitely probable that legal litigation is the reason the NFL and Goodell neglected 
the former plays for so long.  Apologizing could be a form of admitting guilt, thus opening them 
up to different sorts of lawsuits.  However, based off of research by Patel and Reinsch (2003), it 
is possible that they could apologize for their past transgressions, without facing legal 
repercussions if they carefully worded it.  In fact, admitting the League may have held some 
responsibility and apologizing for that possibility may have been better than much of the 
messaging Goodell and the League distributed for the number of years they did it.  Unfortunately 
for Goodell and the NFL, public opinion had already been decided and the government had 
already chosen its side, with both opinions vehemently known.  Rather, if Goodell took a step 
back and let the League acknowledge that they now understood through new science that the 




entire crisis could have ended much sooner for the League.  Compensation for those former 
players would still have to have happened, as that is the new form of apology (Hearit, 2006), but 
their image may have not suffered from the long-term repercussions this compounding crisis has 
brought on.  Indeed, Goodell and the League would have appeared to be listening to their 
audiences.  The former players would have more quickly received the help they needed, and the 
fans and media, who expected this to happen, would have potentially given them credit for the 
actions the League was taking.  Instead, out of fear of legal repercussions, Goodell and the NFL 
chose to avoid the health of their former employees while everyone watched and criticized.   
The NFL is an incredibly recognizable brand in American culture and possibly even the 
world.  The organization itself is distinctive in that the NFL acts as a governing body over the 
thirty-two individual teams that people within the American culture, the fans, actually connect 
with.  Somewhat oddly, its structure and representatives are much more commonly known than 
most other culturally-significant organizations.  In this way, it stands as a cultural touchstone – 
we know and understand enough of how the business side of the League operates, and while 
there is much criticism, the NFL is still a major part of our everyday lives.  Sports, and especially 
football, have never been more popular or financially valuable (Bery, 2013; Isidore, 2013).   A 
part of our popular culture, the sports industry is part of what shapes our assumptions of the 
world.  They influence us, so we look to them to understand how to behave, act, and think, what 
to like and dislike, what is right and wrong (Silk, 2012).  As we look to sports organizations to 
“aid us in making sense of our lives” (Silk, 2012), it should be no surprise, then, that so much 
attention and criticism is given to Roger Goodell and the NFL.  We expect them to be morally 
righteous, taking care of their employees playing on the field no matter how brutal and physical 




organization was able to do this for so many years.  Even with their sheer number of resources 
and ever-growing popularity on their side, Goodell still continued to make mistake after mistake, 
seemingly contradicting with society’s morality related to the former players and long-term brain 
damage.  Ultimately, it was Goodell’s and the League’s constant neglect of the former players 
that made their external audiences and even some of their internal audiences lose trust in the 
organization.  Instead, they further compounded the crisis for the NFL, damaging the League’s 
and Goodell’s image along the way.   
As scholars, we can use the NFL’s failures to further understand how a compounding 
crisis works and affects organizational image repair.  Unfortunately for the NFL, this story is not 
going to disappear any time soon.  As long as Goodell is leading the player health and safety 
initiatives, there will always be criticism and questions of his motivations.  Granted, Goodell has 
attempted to improve the health and safety of the sport through rules, partnerships, and research 
funds, thus making it safer for the current and future players.  While some of these efforts have 
created positive results (Health, 2016), others have been plagued with controversy (Conway, 
2016).  If these strategies continue going forward, Goodell, no matter what responses he offers, 
may continue to struggle with an image issue throughout the rest of his tenure.  Using these ideas 
as a template, I believe this thesis is a foundation of which much research can grow.  The 
controversy and mistakes of Goodell and the NFL are what will continue to give us material to 
study this organization, thus watching this specific compounding crisis grow.    
Conclusion 
After many years of attempting to repair it, it seems that the image audiences have of 
Goodell and the NFL is going to be held for a long time.  Increasingly, audiences more 
vociferously react and critique their new policies and announcements, and for good reason.  If 




a player, then their rhetoric needs to be reviewed to ensure that it contains actions and 
improvements to the sport and its players, not just distributed to improve their image.  One such 
example of this happened in Week 1 of the 2016 season after Carolina Panthers quarterback Cam 
Newton took a horrific-looking blow to his head.  As this was a direct hit, it appeared he should 
have been removed from the game to go through concussion protocol, but he was, in fact, not.  
The NFL was criticized as their brand-new concussion policy was already broken, with the NFL 
essentially explaining that their medical staff and the team’s medical staff felt that there were no 
signs or symptoms of a concussion.  Tom Ley, writing for Deadspin.com (2016), explained what 
this actually meant, “The power of the protocol is based on the NFL’s ability to subjectively 
define two key terms: ‘concussion symptoms’ and ‘big hits.’”  As long as there is a lack of 
reliable science, Goodell and the League have deniability with the sport and head trauma.  And 
with the payout of the settlement to begin in 2017, the League also does not have to admit fault 
or negligence that may have occurred.  A blatant dismissal of their former employees, Goodell 
and the League have created a divide between the organization and the audiences that may never 
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